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Data at the Docks: Modernizing
International Trade Law for the
Digital Economy
Andrew D. Mitchell,* Neha Mishra**
ABSTRACT

The World Trade Organization (WTO) has been slow so far in
responding to the various challenges arising from the integration of
electronic commerce into cross-border trading activities. This slow
response in the multilateral system is largely attributable to the
complex, multifaceted nature of digital trade or electronic commerce,
coupled with the conflict among countries on issues of Internet
regulation and digital development. Nonetheless, international trade
agreements, particularly at the WTO, play an important role in the
creation of a secure, predictable, and trustworthy global regulatory
framework for digital trade, and therefore, need to be reformed in a
timely and meaningful manner to support the growth of the digital
economy. Accordingly, this Article focuses on the limitations of the
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) in liberalizing the
digital sector, eliminating new types of barriersto digital trade such as
data localization, as well as addressing "new" regulatory issues
pertaining to digital trade such as cross-border data flows, data
protection, cybersecurity, and online consumer protection. Further, the
introduction of comprehensive provisions on such issues in Electronic
Commerce Chapters of PreferentialTrade Agreements (PTAs) in recent
years increases the possibility of a potential discord between PTA rules
Moreover, since rules on digital trade are
and the GATS.
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heterogeneous and often conflict across different PTAs, this discord can
potentially fragment and disrupt the global framework for digital
trade in the long run. Therefore, in the Authors' view, WTO law should
take a central role in facilitating a secure and stable legal regulatory
environment for cross-border electronic commerce while undercutting
the current upswing in digitalprotectionism.
To address the above deficiencies in the GATS, the Authors
recommend extensive reforms within the existing multilateral
framework rather than simply relying on WTO tribunals to creatively
interpret existing rules. The Authors believe three broad areas of
reform are necessary in the multilateral framework to promote the
digital economy in a holistic and balanced manner-improving market
access, addressing regulatory barriersin digital trade, and supporting
developing countries to integrate faster into the digital economy.
Several of the Member proposals on electronic commerce placed before
the WTO Work Programme on Electronic Commerce in recent months
provide a useful starting point for constructive dialogue and
negotiations at the WTO, particularly in facilitating a sound
regulatory framework for cross-border data flows, while enhancing
consumer confidence and promoting interests of developing countries
and small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). These reforms can
be supported through incremental changes within the GATS
framework (such as adoption of domestic regulations under GATS
Article VI or development of a Reference Paper or Annex on Electronic
Commerce) or through the adoption of a new WTO agreement. In the
Authors' view, although the second route is politically more
challenging, it is better suited to address the cross-cutting nature of
issues in digital trade, as well as to overcome the various challenges
arising from the antiquated structure of the GATS. Irrespective of
which route is taken for initiating these reforms, the WTO needs to
creatively engage with the broader network of institutions dealing with
digital trade and internet governance, including multistakeholder
institutions, to contribute meaningfully to the formation of a coherent
framework for digital trade.
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I. INTRODUCTION

The unprecedented growth of a highly digitalized economy
marks the beginning of an extremely promising yet challenging era in
international trade law and policy.' Promising, because electronic
commerce or digital trade 2 can help integrate developing countries and
micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs) into the digital
economy and enable consumers to access globally competitive digital
products; 3 and challenging, because the current legal framework
governing global trade is dated and thus woefully inadequate to
address contemporary issues in digital trade. 4 In recent years, a large
amount of research has highlighted the promising future of digital
trade and its role in promoting global economic welfare. 5 According to
the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD), the global electronic commerce market amounted to a
total of $22.1 trillion in 2015.6 Many of the issues related to the

1.
See Nick Ashton-Hart, What Is the "Networked Economy"?, in FUTURE OF THE
GLOBAL TRADE ORDER 133, 133-35 (Carlos A. Primo Braga & Bernard Hoekman eds., 2016)
(arguing that the term "digital economy" refers to all aspects of the Internet economy, and not
just business-to-consumer uses). Ashton-Hart also argues that business-to-business services such
as the cloud and supply chain management constitute 90 percent of the digital economy. Id. at
133.
2.
The terms "digital trade" and "electronic commerce" are used interchangeablyin this
Article. Some experts argue that the ambit of digital trade is much broader than electronic
commerce. See, e.g., Dig. Trade in the U.S. & Glob. Econs., Part 2, Inv. No. 332-540, USITC Pub.
4485, at 29 (Aug. 2014); Mira Burri, Designing Future-OrientedMultilateral Rules for Digital
Trade, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON TRADE IN SERVICES 331, 331 (Pierre Sauv6 & Martin Roy

eds., 2016). However, the Authors are of the view that the WTO's definition of electronic
commerce-meaning "the production, distribution, marketing, sale or delivery of goods and
services by electronic means"-is broad and generic enough to cover most kinds of modern-day
trading activities carried via the Internet. See Gen. Council, Work Programme on Electronic
Commerce, ¶ 1.3, WTO Doc. WT/L/274 (Sept. 30, 1998) [hereinafter Work Programme on ECommerce]; see also Jia-Xiang Hu, When Trade Encounters Technology: The Role of the
Technological Neutrality Principle in the Development of WTO Rules, in SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW: BALANCING COMPETING INTERESTS 75, 76-77

(Bryan Mercurio & Kuei-Jung Ni eds., 2014).
3.
See, e.g., JAMES MANYIKA ET AL., MCKINSEY GLOB. INST., BIG DATA: THE NEXT
FRONTIER FOR INNOVATION, COMPETITION, AND PRODUCTIVITY 2, 4 (2011); ORG. FOR ECON.
CO-OPERATION & DEV., OECD DIGITAL ECONOMY OUTLOOK 2015, at 18 (2015); CHENG OUYANG
ET AL., INCLUSIVE GROWTH AND E-COMMERCE: CHINA'S EXPERIENCE 10-11 (2017).

4.

Stefan Zleptnig, The GATS and Internet-Based Services: Between Market Access and

Domestic Regulation, in THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION AND TRADE IN SERVICES 381, 388-89

(Kern Alexander & Mads Andenas eds., 2007).
5.

See,

e.g.,

JOSHUA

P.

MELTZER,

A

NEW

DIGITAL

TRADE

AGENDA

1

(2015),

http://el5initiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/E15-Digital-Economy-Meltzer-OverviewFINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/8B3Y-Q2RJ].
6.
$22
Trillion
E-Commerce
Opportunity
for
Developing
Countries,
UNITED NATIONS CONF. ON TRADE & DEV. (July 19, 2016), http://unctad.org/es/paginas/
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regulation of electronic commerce are multifaceted in nature and
therefore require initiatives from different domestic and international
institutions. Thus, the governance framework of digital trade is
multilayered and complex, consisting of several kinds of institutions
including trade, human rights, internet governance, and development
Nonetheless, various governments 7 and companies 8
institutions.
increasingly perceive international trade agreements as being at the
heart of the regulation of the digital economy. 9
Although the initiation of the Work Programme on Electronic
Commerce ("Work Programme") in 1998 at the World Trade
Organization (WTO)Io was a promising and timely initiative,"
ideological and political differences between WTO Members stalled
2

2

newsdetails.aspx?OriginalVersionD=1281&Sitemap-x0O20Taxonomy=nformation% 0and% 0
Communication%20Technologies [https://perma.cc/NF7K-EX32].
See Mira Burri, The Regulation of Data Flows Through Trade Agreements, 48 GEO. J.
7.
INT'L L. 407, 418-19 (2017). The US government has identified several protectionist measures in
countries such as China, Russia, Indonesia, Vietnam, and the European Union that have
adversely affected cross-border flows of electronic commerce. OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE
REPRESENTATIVE, FACT SHEET: KEY BARRIERS TO DIGITAL TRADE (2017), https://ustr.gov/about-

us/policy-offices/press-office/fact-sheets/2017/march/key-barriers-digital-trade
[https://perma.ce/4NGJ-AWL4]; see also Econ. Impact of Trade Agreements Implemented Under
Trade Auths. Procedures, 2016 Report, Inv. No. 332-555, USITC Pub. 4614, at 19 (June 2016).
Sweden in particular has published several studies on digital trade. See, e.g.,
KOMMERSKOLLEGIUM [SWED. NAT'L BD. OF TRADE], NO TRANSFER, NO TRADE: THE IMPORTANCE
1 (2014),
OF CROSS-BORDER DATA TRANSFER FOR COMPANIES BASED IN SWEDEN

https://www.kommers.se/Documents/InEnglish/Publications/PDF/NoTransfer

NoTrade.pdf

[https://perma.cc/39VX-YZ7A]; KOMMERSKOLLEGIUM [SWED. NAT'L BD. OF TRADE], SURVEY OF ECOMMERCE BARRIERS WITHIN THE EU: 20 EXAMPLES OF TRADE BARRIERS IN THE DIGITAL
MARKET 3 (2011), https://www.kommers.se/Documents/InEnglish/Publications/
INTERNAL

PDF/Survey-of-e-commerce-barriers-within-the-eu.pdf [https://perma.cc/TM9V-4SBC].
8.
BREAKING

See, e.g., GOOGLE, ENABLING TRADE IN THE ERA OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGIES:
(2010),
1
INFORMATION
OF
FLOW
FREE
THE
TO
BARRIERS
DOWN

https://static.googleusercontent.com/media/www.google.com/en//googleblogs/pdfs/trade-free-flowof information.pdf [https://perma.cc/7RHL-CZXC].
International trade agreements include multilateral, regional, and bilateral trade
9.
agreements.

The Work Programme was set up to "examine all trade-related issues relating to
10.
global electronic commerce." Work Programme on E-Commerce, supra note 2, T 1.1. In order to do
so, different WTO committees were assigned the responsibility to investigate how the WTO
agreements applied to different aspects of electronic commerce-namely, the Council for Trade in
Goods, the Council for Trade in Services, the Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights, and the Committee for Trade and Development, all functioning under the
General Council. Id. T 2.1-5.1; see also World Trade Organization, Geneva Ministerial
Declaration on Global Electronic Commerce, WTO Doc. WT/MIN(98)/DEC/2 (1998).
For example, different WTO committees brought forth several pertinent issues to the
11.
discussion table at the Work Programme including classification of digital products, prohibiting
customs duties on electronic transmissions, increasing participation of developing countries in
electronic commerce, and protection of privacy and public morals. See Work Programme on ECommerce, supra note 2, ¶ 2.1.
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the progress of the Work Programme. 12 Outside of the WTO, the
United States spearheaded the negotiation of Electronic Commerce
Chapters in Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs) since 2000,13
followed by others, such as Australia, Japan, and Singapore, and to a
lesser extent, the European Union and other Asian countries. 14 With
time, demands for such provisions have become common, as seen in
recent PTA negotiations including the Trade in Services Agreement
(TISA), the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP),
and, most recently, the renegotiation of the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA). 15
Similarly, such demands could
potentially surface in the free trade agreement between the United
States and the Republic of Korea (KORUS FTA). 16
Generally
speaking, the multilateral system of the WTO is currently lagging
behind PTAs in addressing issues of the digital economy. However, in
the last year or so, several countries have shown interest in reviving
the Work Programme and made various informal proposals to do so.
The underlying political economy behind these proposals is complex,
since different governments perceive different costs and benefits
arising from digital trade based on their level of economic and
12.
See Hu, supra note 2, at 79-80.
13.
Sacha Wunsch-Vincent, The Digital Trade Agenda of the U.S.: Parallel Tracks of
Bilateral, Regional and MultilateralLiberalization,58 AUSSENWIRTSCHAFT 5, 7-8 (2003). For the
purposes of this Article, PTAs include regional, bilateral, and megaregional trade agreements.
14.
Lior Herman, MultilateralisingRegionalism: The Case of E-Commerce 10-13 (OECD
Trade Policy, Working Paper No. 99, 2010), https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/multilateralisingregionalism-5kmbjx6gw69x.pdf'itemld=%2Fcontent%2Fpaper%2F5kmbjx6gw69xen&mimeType=pdf [https://perma.cc/ES6S-5EXM].
15.
See George Lynch, Canada Open to Digital Trade Adds in NAFTA Renegotiation,
BLOOMBERG L. (Apr. 14, 2017), https://www.bna.com/canada-open-digital-n57982086693/
[https://perma.cclWL8U-C6AL]; Michaela Ross, NAFTA Digital Trade Provisions Sought by Tech
Groups, BLOOMBERG L.: TECH. & TELECOMM. (Aug. 18, 2017), https://teln.bna.com/nafta-digitaltrade-provisions-sought-by-tech-groups/
[https://perma.cc/P3GR-J7E3];
Charlie
Mitchell,
Industry Pushes Cyber Issues in NAFTA and Upcoming Korea Trade Talks, WASH. EXAMINER
(Aug. 20, 2017, 4:00 PM), http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/industry-pushes-cyber-issues-innafta-and-upcoming-korea-trade-talks/article/2632065 [https://perma.cc/QG3T-2JT6]; Amir Nasr,
Tech Experts See NAFTA as Way to Revive Industry-FriendlyTPP Chapters, MORNING CONSULT
(Apr.
6,
2017),
https:/morningconsult.com/2017/04/06/tech-experts-see-nafta-way-reviveindustry-friendly-tpp-chapters/ [https://perma.cclJG8X-9SEG]. See generally North American
Free Trade Agreement, Can.-Mex.-U.S., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993); Press Release, Office
of the U.S. Trade Representative, Statement on TiSA Ministers Meeting (Jan. 22, 2016),
https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2016/january/statement-tisaministers-meeting
[https://perma.cclDT4T-RXLN];
Regional
Comprehensive Economic
Partnership, Known

as RCEP, KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT'L, https://www.keionline.org/rcep

[https://perma.cc/9AY3-JMSZ] (last visited Mar. 27, 2018).
16.
See United States-Korea Free Trade Agreement, S. Kor.-U.S., ch. 15, June 30, 2007
[hereinafter KORUS], https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/korus-fta/finaltext [https://perma.cc/SNP3-CZ79].
17.
See infra Part IV.A.
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sensitivity on issues of privacy,
development;
technological
cybersecurity, and consumer protection; and even their domestic
political ideology in internet governance.
This Article presents a detailed analysis of the multilateral
framework governing digital trade today, and it argues why and how
this framework can and should adapt to the needs of the modern
digital economy. While extensive scholarship has already dealt with
many aspects of electronic commerce and international trade law, 18
this Article contributes to existing scholarship by evaluating the role
and relevance of WTO agreements (more specifically, the General
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)) 19 in today's digital economy
by specifically focusing on the limitations of the GATS in addressing
contemporary policy challenges in digital trade, including potential
conflicts between the GATS and the evolving regime on electronic
commerce in PTAs. After addressing these questions, the Article
offers suggestions on areas and frameworks for reform in the
multilateral trade system to support the growth of the digital
economy. Electronic commerce is also related to other areas such as
even
and
rights,
property
intellectual
telecommunications,
this
of
the
scope
from
excluded
are
those
areas
investment; however,
20
Further, liberalization of the digital industry is dependent
Article.
on improvements in cross-border trade facilitation (including
simplicity of customs procedures and logistics) 21-this subject is also

See, e.g., Burri, supra note 2, at 332; Burri, supra note 7, at 408; Hosuk Lee18.
Makiyama, Cross-Border Data Flows in the Post-Bali Agenda, in BUILDING ON BALI: A WORK
PROGRAMME FOR THE WTO 163, 167 (Simon J. Evenett & Alejandro Jara eds., 2013); Andrew D.
Mitchell & Jarrod Hepburn, Don't Fence Me In: Reforming Trade and Investment Law to Better
Facilitate Cross-Border Data Transfer, 19 YALE J.L. & TECH. 182, 187 (2017); L. Lee Tuthill,
Cross-Border Data Flows: What Role for Trade Rules?, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON TRADE IN
SERVICES, supra note 2, at 357, 359; Sacha Wunsch-Vincent & Arno Hold, Towards Coherent
Rules for Digital Trade: Building on Efforts in Multilateral Versus Preferential Trade
Negotiations, in TRADE GOVERNANCE IN THE DIGITAL AGE 179, 179 (Mira Burri & Thomas Cottier

eds., 2012); Herman, supra note 14, at 6.
General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
19.
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex iB, 1869 U.N.T.S. 183 [hereinafter GATS].
For a comprehensive discussion of these issues, see, for example, Council for Trade20.
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Electronic Commerce and Copyright, WTO Doc.
JOB/GC/113, JOB/IP/19 (Dec. 15, 2016) [hereinafter Electronic Commerce and Copyright]; Peter
K. Yu, Trade Agreement Cats and the Digital Technology Mouse, in SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY IN
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW, supra note 2, at 185, 185-87.
See, e.g., KATI SUOMINEN, INT'L CTR. FOR TRADE & SUSTAINABLE DEV., FUELLING
21.
TRADE IN THE DIGITAL ERA: POLICY ROADMAP FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

17-18 (2017),

&

https://www.ictsd.org/sites/default/files/research/suominen-fuelling-tradein thedigital-era_.0.p
df [https://perma.cc/FD3G-AY32]; Yann Duval & Kong Mengjing, Paperless Trade in Regional
Trade Agreements 1 (United Nations Econ. & Soc. Comm'n for Asia & the Pac., Trade, Inv.
Innovation, Working Paper No. 02/16, 2016), http://www.unescap.org/sites/default/files/
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not directly covered in this Article. Finally, the Article does not
specifically cover issues related to trade in physical goods enabled
through electronic commerce portals but more broadly focuses on
services and products provided or delivered digitally.
Part II of this Article evaluates the political economy shaping
the electronic commerce agenda at the WTO and other international
trade platforms. Part III of the Article argues why the existing rules
in the GATS are deficient in addressing the nature of legal and policy
challenges in digital trade today. Further, that Part discusses the
gaps and potential areas of discord between the rules governing digital
trade in the GATS and PTAs. Part IV then recommends specific
reforms within the WTO as follows. First, it sets out how the Work
Programme is likely to evolve in the coming years to accommodate
challenges in the digital economy. Second, it outlines ideas for reform
in relation to three broad areas-improving market access, promoting
regulatory reforms, and improving participation of developing
countries in the digital economy. Finally, it describes the various
avenues available for reform within the multilateral context.
Part V of the Article concludes by arguing that the WTO can
play an instrumental role in the digital economy by facilitating a
secure and stable legal regulatory environment for cross-border
electronic commerce as well as undercutting the current upswing in
digital protectionism. While the WTO is an important platform to
negotiate on issues related to digital trade, the growing network of
PTAs can complement (but not replace) negotiations on electronic
commerce at the WTO, provided that issues related to digital trade are
selected and addressed in these PTAs in a balanced, coherent, and
representative manner.
Owing to the peculiar multistakeholder
nature of the broader regulatory environment for cyberspace, open
and transparent dialogues between governments, businesses, and civil
society will remain critical in reforming international trade law
pertaining to electronic commerce. 22
While multistakeholder
involvement at the WTO and other international trade institutions
appears unusual and politically challenging, it is indispensable to
achieve a delicate balance between liberalizing electronic commerce
and protecting important policy concerns in the regulation of the
cyberspace.
Paperless%20Trade%20in%2ORegional%2OTrade%2OAgreements_2.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8YKYWF5Q].
22.
See Burri, supra note 2, at 332-35; Margot E. Kaminski, Privacy Is Not a Barrierto
Trade: How a Secretive Trade Agreement Could Change the Global Internet., SLATE
(June 4, 2015,
5:37 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future-tense/2015/06/
trade-inservices-agreement-could-changethe-global-internet.html
[https://perma.cc/NU2CKNVQ].
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II. THE COMPLEX POLITICAL ECONOMY OF DIGITAL TRADE

The political economy of digital trade is driven by a complex set
of factors representing the varied interests of stakeholders from the
Powerful
technology industry, governments, and civil society.
corporate lobbies, governments with significant interests in the digital
industry (such as the United States, China, and the European Union),
and countries with a huge population base of untapped Internet
consumers (such as India, China, Indonesia, and Vietnam) are
emerging as the most significant players in the digital economy. The
policy and ideological conflict between different groups of countries
continues to stall the pace of regional and international trade
negotiations (as well as legal developments in other international
platforms). 23 Since the early days of electronic commerce, the US
government realized its comparative advantage in the digital sector
and pushed for openness in digital markets through, for example, the
Framework for Global Electronic Commerce-a proposal by the
Clinton administration in 1997-and the inclusion of Electronic
Commerce Chapters in PTAs under the Bush administration. 2 4
Recent years have seen the US government taking a more targeted
stance on various policy platforms, including international trade
agreements, to counterweigh the rise of digital powers such as China
as well as to push back on the proliferation of EU-type data protection
policies. 25
While developing countries stand to gain from the growth of
electronic commerce (particularly MSMEs operating in those
countries), companies based in developed countries own the majority
of the dominant Internet platforms and digital technologies. The only
exception is that of China, which despite being a developing country
Wunsch-Vincent & Hold, supra note 18, at 181-83.
23.
See Memorandum on Electronic Commerce, 2 PUB. PAPERS 898, 898-99 (July 1,
24.
1997); Wunsch-Vincent, supra note 13, at 7-8; see also Peter Drahos, The Bilateral Web of Trade
https://www.twn.my/
Dispute Settlement 5-6 (May 2005) (unpublished manuscript),
See
title2/FTAs/DisputeResolution/TheBilateralWebOfTradeDisputeSettlementPeterDrahos.doc.
generally EXEC.

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,

THE FRAMEWORK FOR GLOBAL

ELECTRONIC

https://clintonwhitehouse4.archives.gov/WH/New/Commerce/
(1997),
COMMERCE
[https://perma.cc/DF67-ML5A].
See, e.g., Cheng Li, Assessing U.S.-China Relations Under the Obama
25.
Administration, BROOKINGS (Aug. 30, 2016), https://www.brookings.edulopinions/assessing-u-schina-relations-under-the-obama-administration/ [https://perma.cc/UCN7-ANCX]; see also Chen
Weihua, China, US to Advance Cybersecurity Cooperation, CHINA DAILY (Dec. 8, 2016, 3:21 PM),
[https://perma.cc/P5REhttp://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2016-12/08/content_27613407.htm
KKXV ]. But see Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, United States-European
Union Trade Principles for Information and Communication Technology Services (Apr. 4, 2011)
(announcing the adoption of "a set of non-binding trade-related principles for information and
communication technology (ICT) services" between the United States and European Union).
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has emerged as a global powerhouse in the digital sector. 26
Consequently, many developing countries face pressure from powerful
lobbies to adopt regulations similar to developed countries, even when
they have insufficient regulatory capacity.
Further, despite the
economic advantages of electronic commerce, many developing
countries face challenges in maximizing their benefits from the global
digital supply chain for reasons such as poor Internet infrastructure,
lack of sufficient domestic technical expertise, low participation in
technical innovation and standard setting, and the dominance of US
companies in the technology industry. 27
The stiff digital war between China and the United States over
the last decade or so is symptomatic of the fast-changing dynamics of
the digital economy described above. The Chinese government has
argued that, being a developing country, it has a "less favourable
external environment for promoting innovation, and faces greater
pressure to maintain economic and industrial security," unlike the
United States, which is disproportionately focused on industry
interests. 28
However, China is an exception among developing
countries because companies such as Alibaba, Baidu, Huawei, and
WeChat are strong contenders in the global market today. 29 This
growth was arguably a result of the strong protectionist policies of the
Chinese government, giving these companies exclusive access to a
domestic population of over one billion. 30 China is now emerging as a
champion of developing country interests, advocating issues such as
trade facilitation for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and
improving trade finance for electronic commerce at the WTO. 3 1
26.

See infra text accompanying note 29.

27.

See WORLD BANK GRP., WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2016: DIGITAL DIVIDENDS 6,

16 (2016); Burcu Kilic & Renata Avila, A New Digital Trade Agenda: Are We Giving Away the
Internet?, OPENDEMOCRACY (July 13, 2017), https://www.opendemocracy.net/digitaliberties/
renata-avila-burcu-kilic/new-digital-trade-agenda-are-we-giving-away-internet
[https://perma.cc/3TMS-BTHC].
28.
TRADE

MINISTRY OF COMMERCE [CHINA], RESEARCH REPORT ON CHINA-US ECONOMIC AND
21
(2017),
http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/newsrelease/

RELATIONS

significantnews/201705/20170502582932.shtml [https://perma.cc/NY7H-SUJC].
29.

See, e.g., TOM BIRTWHISTLE, PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS,

THE RISE OF CHINA'S

SILICON DRAGON
1,
9,
11 (2016),
https://www.pwc.com.au/asia-practice/publications/
rise of china silicon dragon apr2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/7353-MGE8]; JONATHAN WOETZEL ET
AL., MCKINSEY GLOB. INST., CHINA'S DIGITAL ECONOMY: A LEADING GLOBAL FORCE 1, 9-10, 18

(2017), https://www.mckinsey.com/global-themes/china/chinas-digital-economy-a-leading-globalforce [https://perma.cc/KE4K-YWXC].
30.
See MARTINA F. FERRACANE & HOSUK LEE-MAKIYAMA, EUR. CTR. FOR INT'L
POLITICAL ECON., CHINA'S TECHNOLOGY PROTECTIONISM AND ITS NON-NEGOTIABLE RATIONALES

4-6 (2017), http://ecipe.org/app/uploads/2017/06/China-Tech-Protectionism.pdf
9BEE-GZV7].
31.
See infra Part IV.A.3.

[https://perma.cc/
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Simultaneously, however, Chinese domestic policies continue to
dissuade foreign competition in the digital sector under the garb of
national security or public order. 32 Other developing countries that
tend to support protectionist laws and policies in the digital industry
include Indonesia, India, Russia, and Vietnam. 33 However, developed
countries are also adopting protectionist policies in the digital sector,
as exemplified by the push for a local cloud in France and Germany. 34
In addition to governments and companies, civil society
organizations-including Internet advocacy organizations-play an
important role in influencing the public perception of international
trade agreements and electronic commerce. During the negotiation of
the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP), 35 several civil society
advocates criticized both the procedure under which the negotiations
were conducted as well as the net impact of these provisions on user
rights, domestic governance, and Internet governance. Particularly,
their advocacy campaigns criticized the lack of adequate
representation of interests of developing countries in the TPP
negotiations and the predominance of US corporate interests. 36
However, other groups including the Information Technology and
Information Foundation and Digital Europe came out in strong
support of the TPP, vindicating the use of international trade law to

32.

Members Debate Cyber Security and Chemicals at Technical Barriers to Trade

Committee, WORLD

TRADE

ORG.

(June

14-15,

2017),

https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/

newsl7_e/tbtL20junl7_e.htm [https://perma.cc/GFM7-ZALB].
For a discussion of the relevant laws and policies, see Glob. Dig. Trade 1: Mkt.
33.
Opportunities and Key Foreign Trade Restrictions, Inv. No. 332-561, USITC Pub. 4716, at 271306 (Aug. 2017).
34.
Patrick Lane, In the Global Computing "Cloud", Geography Will Matter More,
ECONOMIST (Nov. 18, 2013), https://www.economist.com/news/21589110-global-computing-cloud[https://perma.cc/K5AM-Q6MS]; see John T.
geography-will-matter-more-data-protectionism
Billings, European Protectionism in Cloud Computing: Addressing Concerns over the PATRIOT
Act, 21 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS: J. COMM L. & TECH. POL'Y 211, 212 (2012).
Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, ch. 14, Feb. 4, 2016 (not yet in force)
35.
[hereinafter TPP Agreement], https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/transpacific-partnership/tpp-full-text [https://perma.cc/2CDK-E96E]. The United States withdrew
from this agreement in 2017; thereafter, the remaining eleven parties concluded a different
agreement known as the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific
Partnership (CPTPP). The provisions on electronic commerce in the CPTPP are identical to the
TPP. See Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, ch. 14,
March 8, 2018 (not yet in force), https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/trade/free-trade-agreements/freetrade-agreements-concluded-but-not-in-force/cptpp/comprehensive-and-progressive-agreementfor-trans-pacific-partnership-text/ [https://perma.cc/RX9B-L47U].
For example, see remarks by Burcu Kilic, How Trade Agreements Shape the Future
36.
of Internet Governance, INTERNET GOVERNANCE F. (2015), http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/187-

igf-2015/transcripts-igf-2015/2925-2015- 11-1 1-ws-7-how-trade-agreements-shape-the-future-ofinternet-governance-workshop-room-5-finished [https://perma.cc/ZVF7-VY5W].
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build a regulatory framework for electronic commerce3 7 and rejecting
the use of so-called "tech populism." 38
While doing so, these
organizations
recommended
new
policies
that
give
greater
consideration to balancing innovation and liberalization with user
interests and public policy considerations at the domestic and
international levels.
Despite the nuances in the policy stance of various
stakeholders in the digital economy, countries are converging on
certain broad approaches in the regulation of electronic commerce
based on shared political ideologies and economic interests.
This
Article categorizes these three broad approaches as the market-based
approach, the interventionist approach, and the guarded approach.
Proponents of the market-based approach provide significant
choice to the technology industry to implement user policies that
balance consumer interests with commercial interests in electronic
commerce and achieve more innovation and growth.
Prominent
examples include the United States and Japan.
These countries
typically also support a multistakeholder governance structure in
cyberspace. However, critics argue that this approach is imbalanced
and disproportionately favors the technology industry, especially in
relation to enforcement of online intellectual property rights and the
protection of user privacy. 39 Recent years have also seen a rather
public conflict between the US government and leading US technology
companies on issues of online surveillance and encryption. 40
Proponents of the interventionist approach, meanwhile, favor a
higher degree of regulatory intervention in electronic commerce (e.g.,
37.
DIGITALEUROPE, DIGITALEUROPE ASSESSMENT OF THE TRANS-PACIFIC
PARTNERSHIP (TPP) PROVISIONS 3 (2016), http://www.digitaleurope.org/DesktopModules/
Bring2mind/DMX/Download.aspx?Command=CoreDownload&Entryld=1090&anguage=enUS&Portalld=0&Tabld=353 [https://perma.cc/5NZN-HD3Z].
38.
See ROBERT D. ATKINSON ET AL., INFO. TECH. & INNOVATION FOUND., How TECH
POPULISM IS UNDERMINING INNOVATION 1-2 (2015); DANIEL CASTRO, INFO. TECH. & INNOVATION
FOUND., STRICTER PRIVACY REGULATIONS FOR ONLINE ADVERTISING WILL HARM THE FREE

INTERNET 1 (2010); Fredrik Erixon et al., Protectionism Online: Internet Censorship and
InternationalTrade Law 6 (Eur. Ctr. for Int'l Political Econ., Working Paper No. 12/2009, 2009),
http://ecipe.org/app/uploads/2014/12/protectionism-online-internet-censorship-and-internationaltrade-law.pdf [https://perma.cc/K9BT-7EFV].
39.
See, e.g., JANE KELSEY & BURCU KILIC, BRIEFING ON US TISA PROPOSAL ON
E-COMMERCE, TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER, CROSS-BORDER DATA FLOWS AND NET NEUTRALITY 3

(2014),
http://www.world-psi.org/sites/default/files/documents/research/briefing-on-tisa-ecommerce-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/YNF9-E5HG].
40.
See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 829 F.3d 197, 200 (2d Cir. 2016) (involving
Microsoft's refusal to provide data to the US government that was stored in Ireland), cert.
granted, 138 S. Ct. 356 (2017); In re Search of Content Stored at Premises Controlled by Google
Inc., No. 16-mc-08263-RS, 2017 WL 3478809, at *1-3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 2017) (detailing
Google's opposition to the disclosure of data stored in foreign countries).
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setting stronger legal requirements to protect consumers' right to
privacy in sensitive sectors such as health and finance), while
generally acknowledging the benefits of liberalization in digital trade.
Examples of countries that favor an interventionist approach include
the European Union, Australia, Canada, Korea, and Taiwan-in
varying degrees. In recent trade negotiations such as the TISA, the
inclination of these countries toward an interventionist approach is
reflected through their comprehensive proposals on data protection,
Particularly in the
consumer protection, and similar issues. 4 1
European Union, civil society organizations (e.g., Internet advocacy
rights
human
and
groups,
rights
consumer
organizations,
domestic
the
organizations) play an important role in influencing
policy agenda on digital trade. 42 Despite the deep ideological divide
between the European Union and the United States on data protection
and privacy, they agreed upon a data-transfer mechanism known as
the EU-US Safe Harbor (which was replaced by the Privacy Shield' in
2016).43 However, the Privacy Shield remains susceptible to legal
challenge and is often viewed with suspicion by European
governments, even though the US administration has expressed its
commitment to the agreement.4 4
Finally, proponents of a guarded approach tend to remain
cautious regarding the regulation of the Internet and Internet-based
services and aim to exercise strong control over policies related to data
protection, online censorship, and cybersecurity to protect domestic
interests. 45 Many developing countries (e.g., Indonesia, China, and

See Trade in Services Agreement, Annex on Electronic Commerce art. 1(2), Sept. 16,
41.
2013 (EU copy of proposed agreement), https://wikileaks.org/tisa/document/20151001_Annex-on[https://perma.cc/2XYGElectronic-Commerce/20 151001_Annex-on-Electronic-Commerce.pdf
ZHX8]; see also Eur. Comm'n, Exchanging and ProtectingPersonal Data in a Globalised World,
at 2, COM (2017) 7 final (Jan. 10, 2017).
The European Union has mechanisms for ongoing dialogues with the civil society on
42.
various issues including trade and investment. See, e.g., Expert Group on Trade Agreements,

EUR. COMMISSION (Dec. 22, 2017), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1776
[https://perma.cclN5E8-9PZH].
See Bernard Marr, Privacy Shield-Is Safe Harbour'sReplacement Up to the Job in
43.
2017?, FORBES (Mar. 29, 2017, 2:42 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/
2017/03/29/privacy-shield-is-safe-harbours-replacement-up-to-the-job-in-2017/#3405d5a66736
see also EU-US Privacy Shield, EUR. COMMISSION,
[https://perma.cc/5ZNB-AVAP];
https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-topic/data-protection/data-transfers-outside-eu/eu-us-privacyshield-en [https://perma.cc/K6ZJ-5MFA] (last visited Mar. 28, 2018).
Trump Puts U.S.-EU Privacy Shield at Risk,
Kerry,
F.
Cameron
44.
BROOKINGS: TECHTANK (June 14, 2017), https://www.brookings.edulblog/techtank/2017/06/14/
trump-puts-u-s-eu-privacy-shield-at-risk/?utm.campaign=Brookings%20Brief&utm-source=
hs email&utm medium=email&utmcontent=53146458 [https://perma.cclWTP5-PTTS].
45.

See, e.g., NIGEL CORY, INFO. TECH. & INNOVATION FOUND., THE WORST INNOVATION

MERCANTILIST POLICIES OF 2016, at 1-2 (2017); Jon Stone, Theresa May Says the Internet Must
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Russia) and more recently, certain developed countries (e.g., the
United Kingdom and France) tend to follow this approach. While
remaining very guarded toward the development of the Internet, these
countries are also aware of the hidden potential of electronic
commerce. For example, developing countries have collaborated as
the Friends of E-Commerce for Development at the WTO (consisting
of, inter alia, Argentina, Costa Rica, Kenya, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Sri
Lanka), 46 and China has expressed strong support for trade
facilitation and trade finance for e-commerce SMEs. 47
On the other hand, certain other countries, such as several
African countries, have openly opposed the inclusion of new electronic
commerce issues at the ongoing negotiations at the WTO. A proposal
from certain African countries before the Work Programme stated that
"digital industrial policy" (including data localization and Internet
filtering) might be necessary for developing countries to catch up with
global leaders in technology, possibly drawing from the Chinese
example. 48 Further, this proposal suggests that the "digital trade
agenda" at the WTO would "constrain the ability of governments to
implement industrial policy and catch-up," 49 and thus expresses
caution regarding the role of the WTO in areas such as spam,
e- authentication, e-signatures, and consumer protection.5 0
The divide in the ideologies and policy preferences of different
countries is often reflected in the wording of provisions related to
electronic commerce in PTAs. Although it is outside the scope of this
Article to compare provisions on electronic commerce in various PTAs,
different studies have revealed that the PTAs initiated by countries
such as the United States and Japan tend to have more liberalizing

Now Be Regulated Following London Bridge Terror Attack, INDEPENDENT (June 4, 2017, 11:45
AM),

http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/theresa-may-internet-regulated-london-

bridge-terror-attack-google-facebook-whatsapp-borough-security-a777 1896.html
[https://perma.cc/HB87-8RYPI.
46.
See Friends of E-Commerce for Development Launch Roadmap for International
Trade and Development Policy, UNITED NATIONS CONF.

ON TRADE & DEV.

(May 4, 2017),

http://unctad.org/en/pages/newsdetails.aspx?OriginalVersionlD=1477
[https://perma.cc/NCK3XXUB].
47.
See Communication from the People's Republic of China, Aiming at the 11th
Ministerial Conference, at 1, WTO Doc. JOB/GC/110, JOB/CTG/2 JOB/SERV/243, JOB/DEV/39
(Nov. 16, 2016) [hereinafter Aiming at the 11th Ministerial Conference].
48.
Communication from the African Group, Report of Panel Discussion on "Digital
Industrial Policy and Development", ¶¶ 1.7-1.8, WTO Doc. JOB/GC/133 (July 21, 2017)
[hereinafter Report on "Digital Industrial Policy and Development']; see also Ministerial
Conference, ACP Group MinisterialDeclarationon the 11th WTO Ministerial Conference, ¶ 1.3,
WTO Doc. WT/MIN(17)/3 (Oct. 26, 2017).
49.
Report on "DigitalIndustrialPolicy and Development", supra note 48, 1 1.8.
50.
Id. I 1.10.
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provisions on digital trade and are thus inclined toward a more
market-based approach, while EU PTAs tend to have more minimal
disciplines on electronic commerce. 1 Further, while certain recent
Chinese PTAs have incorporated basic provisions on electronic
commerce, they tend to avoid complex regulatory issues such as
cross-border data flows. 5 2 Due to these divergent approaches, it is
harder to implement uniform trade rules at a multilateral level. Since
electronic commerce issues are influenced by a complex political
economy, policy coherence is necessary across different aspects, such
as market access and liberalization commitments, protection of
consumer interests, promotion of innovation, safeguarding of domestic
security and public policy, and regulation of the Internet.5 3 To that
extent, international trade platforms are essential but not sufficient to
54
promote a coherent regulatory framework for the digital economy.

Despite these limitations, many WTO Members have expressed
a strong desire to achieve significant progress on electronic commerce
so that WTO agreements remain relevant in the age of the digital
economy.5 5 The Director-General of the WTO, Roberto Azevido, has
repeatedly emphasized that progress on the electronic commerce
agenda is vital for the legitimacy of the WTO as an international trade
institution. 56 He has also shown public support for the Electronic
World Trade Platform (eWTP) to enable SMEs to conduct cross-border
digital trade-an initiative of Chinese Internet marketplace
See Wunsch-Vincent, supra note 13, at 8, 22; Jos6-Antonio Monteiro & Robert Teh,
51.
Provisions on Electronic Commerce in Regional Trade Agreements 36, 37 fig.30 (WTO, Working
Paper No. ERSD-2017-11, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=3005148.
See Rolf H. Weber, Opinion, The Expansion of E-Commerce in Asia-Pacific Trade
52.
Agreements,

INT'L

CTR.

FOR

TRADE

&

SUSTAINABLE

DEV.

(Sept.

10,

2015),

https://www.ictsd.org/opinion/the-expansion-of-e-commerce-in-asia-pacific-trade-agreements
[https://perma.ccl76HR-E9PC];see also Jie Huang, Comparison of E-Commerce Regulations in
Chinese and American FTAs: Converging Approaches, Diverging Contents, and Polycentric
Directions?, 64 NETH. INT'L L. REV. 309, 311 (2017).
See Gen. Council, Possible Way Forward on Electronic Commerce, at 3, WTO Doc.
53.
JOB/GC/130 (July 14, 2017) [hereinafter Possible Way Forward on Electronic Commerce]
(providing an illustrative list of issues in electronic commerce).
See infra Parts IV, V.
54.
See Junichi Ihara, Ambassador & Permanent Representative to WTO, Japan, WTO
55.
in the Era of Mega-Regional Trade Agreements (June 13, 2003), http://archive.ipu.org/splze/trade16.htm; WTO Members Discuss the Role of E-Commerce in FosteringDevelopment, WORLD
https://www.wto.org/english/newse/newsl7_e/
2017),
14,
(Mar.
ORG.
TRADE
devel14marl7_e.htm [https://perma.cc/GX86-JEUU]; see also Shawn Donnan, WTO Wrestles
2017),
FIN.
TIMES
(Dec.
13,
Relevance
in
Age
of
Ecommerce,
with
[https://perma.cc/Q5CLhttps://www.ft.com/content/d9f63c20-eO1d-11e7-a8a4-0ale63a52f9c
PEUB].
See, e.g., Roberto Azevbdo, Dir.-Gen., World Trade Org., Remarks at MIKTA
56.
Workshop on Electronic Commerce (July 5, 2016), https://www.wto.org/english/news-e/spra-e/
spral32_e.htm [https://perma.cc/A5KF-WQBG].
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Alibaba-which is an unusual development given the predominantly
state-to-state nature of the WTO.5 7 Despite these initiatives, the
existing legal agreements under the WTO, such as the GATS, remain
largely ineffective in addressing contemporary challenges in digital
trade as well as facilitating the liberalization of the digital sector, as
discussed in the next Part.
III. IMPORTANT GAPS IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW ON ELECTRONIC
COMMERCE

A. GATS DisciplinesAre Insufficient to Deal with New-Age Issues in
Electronic Commerce
1. The Dated Structure of the GATS Does Not Help in Effective
Liberalization Commitments
The GATS is the primary international trade agreement
containing relevant rules for international trade in services across all
sectors 5 8 and four different modes of supply-cross-border supply
"from the territory of one Member into the territory of another
Member" (Mode 1); consumption abroad or "where a service consumer
(e.g., tourist or patient) moves into another member's territory to
obtain a service" (Mode 2); commercial presence or "where a service
supplier of one member establishes a territorial presence" in another's
territory to provide a service (Mode 3); and "presence of natural
persons" or when "persons of one member ente[r] the territory of
another member to supply a service" (Mode 4).59
The existing GATS framework is insufficient in promoting
progressive realization of the digital economy for various reasons.
First, the application of certain legal obligations under the GATS
(such as national treatment 60 and market access 6 1 ) is contingent on

57.
See Roberto Azev6do, Dir.-Gen., World Trade Org., Remarks at WTO-eWTP-WEF
Enabling E-Commerce Launch Event (Dec. 11, 2017), https://www.wto.org/english/news-el
sprae/spra206_e.htm [https://perma.cc/PR24-FYCU]; see also WTO, World Economic Forum and
eWTP Launch Joint Public-PrivateDialogue to Open Up E-Commerce for Small Business, WORLD
TRADE ORG. (Dec. 11, 2017), https://www.wto.org/english/news-e/newsl7-e/ecoml1decl7_e.htm
[https://perma.cc/32AX-8RZH].
58.
GATS, supra note 19, art. 1:1. However, the GATS defines services to exclude
"services supplied in the exercise of governmental authority." Id. art 1:3(b).
59.
Id. art. 1:2; RAMGOPAL AGARWALA, INDIA 2050: A ROADMAP TO SUSTAINABLE
PROSPERITY 111 (2014).
60.
"National treatment" means that a country cannot provide preferential treatment to
its domestic industry. See GATS, supra note 19, art. XVII.
61.
Id. art. XVI.
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62
the scope of commitments inscribed by a country in its schedule.
63
Even with respect to the most favored nation (MFN) obligation, a
country can inscribe broad exceptions under the GATS. 64 In other
words, WTO Members enjoy a high degree of autonomy in determining
the extent to which they are prepared to open up a specific sector to
foreign companies, and further, are free to prescribe limitations in the
opening up of a sector (for example, to comply with domestic licensing
requirements, to limit the extent of foreign equity, or to require
specific technical qualifications). 65 Second, the boundaries between
disciplines on domestic regulation 66 and market acceSS 6 7 are unclear in
Particularly after the Appellate Body's report in
the GATS.
US-Gambling,68 Members are concerned that even qualitative
restrictions on digital services (in this case, a restriction on online
gambling, or what the WTO tribunal characterized as a "zero quota")
may constitute a prima facie breach of a country's legal commitments
under the GATS. 69
Second, although the Services Sectoral Classification List (the
"W/120")7 0 provides a reference point for WTO Members while making

62.
63.
64.
65.

Id. art. XX; see also id. arts. XVI, XVII.
MFN means providing the same treatment to all trading partners. Id. art. II.
Id. art. 11:2.
Tuthill, supranote 18, at 374.

66.

Provisions on domestic regulations set a requirement that any measure relating to

qualification requirements and procedures, technical standards, and licensing requirements "do
not constitute unnecessary barriers to trade in services." See GATS, supra note 19, art. VI:4.
Id. art. XVI.
67.
See Appellate Body Report, United States-Measures Affecting the Cross-Border
68.
Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, WTO Doc. WT/DS285/AB/R (adopted Apr. 20, 2005)
[hereinafter US-GamblingAppellate Body Report].
See id. ¶ 238; see also Panagiotis Delimatsis, Don't Gamble with GATS-The
69.
Interaction Between Articles VI, XVI, XVII and XVIII GATS in the Light of the US-Gambling
Case, 40 J. WORLD TRADE 1059, 1062 (2006); Joost Pauwelyn, Rien ne Va Plus? Distinguishing
Domestic Regulation from Market Access in GATT and GATS, 4 WORLD TRADE REV. 131 (2005);
Shin-Yi Peng, Regulating New Services Through Litigation? Electronic Commerce as a Case
Study on the Evaluation of 'JudicialActivism' in the WTO, 48 J. WORLD TRADE 1189, 1208-10
(2014); Lode Van Den Hende, Herbert Smith LLP, GATS Article XVI and National Regulatory
Sovereignty: What Lessons to Draw from US-Gambling?, in THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION
AND TRADE IN SERVICES, supra note 4, at 460, 468.

The W/120 contains a comprehensive list of service sectors and subsectors covered
70.
under the GATS. This list was prepared by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
Secretariat in 1991. See GATT Secretariat, Services Sectoral Classification List, GATT Doc.
MTN.GNS/W/120 (July 10, 1991) [hereinafter Services Sectoral Classification List]. The
classification of sectors in the W/120 refers to the Central Product Classification (CPC) prepared
by the United Nations, which is a product-based classification system that was first published in
1991 (then known as the Provisional CPC). See Central Product Classification (CPC), OECD:
GLOSSARY OF STATISTICAL TERMS, https://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=309 (last visited
Mar.

28,

2018).

See
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commitments under the GATS, 7 1 this classification is almost three
decades old and does not adequately represent business sectors of a
digital economy. Many digital offerings are products of converging
business models which increasingly combine telecommunications
services with other services, including computer, audiovisual,
banking, financial, and advertising services.
These services are
multifunctional in nature and use various forms of services to provide
a comprehensive digital platform. For example, WeChat and Google
combine various services such as communication, payments, web
mapping, social networking, and cloud computing. 72 However, in a
country's schedule, commitments on a service sector or subsector are
exclusive; 73 thus, a specific digital service (like the search engine
services of Google) cannot be simultaneously classified under
computer and related services (more specifically, data processing
services), telecommunications services (online information and data
processing services), and advertising services. 74 In other words, for
search engine services, the relevant commitments of a Member will be
for one specific subsector and not several subsectors, although
arguably search engine services might fit into. the descriptions of
various subsectors. 75 Further, since comprehensive digital platforms
were unimaginable during the inception of the GATS, legal
uncertainty exists regarding whether these products fit into specified
sectors in the W/120 or constitute new sectors altogether. 76 For
STATISTICS],

CPC

PROVISIONAL

INTRODUCTION,

https://osp.stat.gov.lt/documents/10180/

2905525/CPCProv_Introduction.pdf [https://perma.cc/H7EH-6CCV] (last visited Mar. 28, 2018).
71.
US-Gambling Appellate Body Report, supra note 68, ¶¶ 189, 194; Panel Report,
Mexico-Measures Affecting Telecommunications Services, 1 7.59, WTO Doc. WT/DS204/R
(adopted June 1, 2004) [hereinafter Mexico-Telecoms Panel Report].
72.
Mohit Mittal, WeChat-The One App That Rules Them All, MEDIUM (Mar. 10, 2017),
https://medium.com/harvard-business-school-digital-initiative/wechat-the-one-app-that-rulesthem-all-38a876d04f3b
[https://perma.cclD2KS-9T2J];
Our
Products,
GOOGLE,
https://www.google.de/intl/en-de/about/products/ [https://perma.cc/LVD3-C5V8] (last visited Mar.
28, 2018); WeChat's World: China's Mobile Internet, ECONOMIST (Aug. 6, 2016),
https://www.economist.com/news/business/21703428-chinas-wechat-shows-way-social-mediasfuture-wechats-world [https://perma.cc/TLC8-PYMJ].
73.
US-Gambling Appellate Body Report, supra note 68, ¶¶ 172, 180, 185; Panel
Report, United States-MeasuresAffecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling, 16.101, WTO
Doc. WT/DS285/R (adopted Apr. 20, 2005).
74.
Over 95 percent of Google's revenue comes from advertising and not through its
search engines or email services, which are provided free of charge to Internet users. See Google
Business Model,
GOOGLE,
https://sites.google.com/site/net205apples/google-business-model
[https://perma.cc/PQS5-XM79] (last visited Mar. 28, 2018).
75.
See MARK Wu, DIGITAL TRADE-RELATED PROVISIONS IN REGIONAL TRADE
AGREEMENTS: EXISTING MODELS AND LESSONS FOR THE MULTILATERAL TRADE SYSTEM 4-5

(2017).
76.

ROLF H. WEBER & MIRA BURRI, CLASSIFICATION OF SERVICES IN THE DIGITAL

ECONOMY 49 (2012); Lee Tuthill & Martin Roy, GATS Classification Issues for Information and
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example, developing countries tend to argue that services such as
Facebook or Google are "new services" and outside the scope of the
W/120, while most developed countries argue to the contrary.7 7 The
Appellate Body has favored a technologically neutral interpretation of
the commitments made by Members in their GATS Schedules, without
stating so explicitly.7 8 As a result, it is arguable that few digital
services would qualify as "new services," although such an
interpretation may affect countries that are highly sensitive regarding
how the Internet and digital services should be regulated within their
borders. 79
2. The GATS Cannot Effectively Address Cross-Border Data Flows
and Related Issues
The cross-border flow of data via the Internet is the driving
vehicle for all kinds of trading activity today.8 0 The majority of
restrictions on Internet-based services are not customs duties but
regulatory measures affecting data flows into and out of the borders of
the country, such as measures related to privacy.8 1 The WTO legal
framework acknowledges the importance of cross-border data flows to
For instance, the GATS Annex on
a limited extent.
Telecommunications contains provisions that acknowledge the
importance of maintaining free cross-border data flows while at the
same time paying heed to considerations of privacy and data
Communication Technology Services, in TRADE GOVERNANCE IN THE DIGITAL AGE, supra note 18,

at 157, 167.
77.

Compare Statement

by the

African

Group,

Work Programme on

Electronic

Commerce, TT 2.3, 2.5, WTO Doc. JOB/GC/144 (Oct. 20, 2017) [hereinafter Statement by the
African Group] (objecting to the expansion of the existing schedule of commitments to modernday services such as 3D printing, robotics, drone delivery, and artificial intelligence), with
Comm. on Specific Commitments, Report of the Meeting Held on 18 September 2014: Note by the
Secretariat, at 1-3, WTO Doc. S/CSC/M/71 (Oct. 15, 2014) (summarizing the perspectives of
developed countries that welcomed a broader interpretation of the Schedule of Commitments).
See Appellate Body Report, China-Measures Affecting Trading Rights and
78.
Distribution Services for Certain Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products, T 396,
WTO Doc. WT/DS363/AB/R (adopted Jan. 19, 2010) [hereinafter China-Publications and
Entertainment Products Appellate Body Report]; see also Shin-yi Peng, Renegotiate the WTO
"Schedules of Commitments"?: Technological Development and Treaty Interpretation, 45
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 403, 428-29 (2012).
79.
See Rousi Zhang, Covered or Not Covered: That Is the Question 14-17 (WTO,
https://www.wto.org/english/res-e/
2015),
ERSD-2015-11,
No.
Paper
Working
reser e/ersd201511_e.pdf [https://perma.cc/JAQ3-WJ98].
Tuthill, supra note 18, at 357-58.
80.
USMAN AHMED & ANUPAM CHANDER, INFORMATION GOEs GLOBAL: PROTECTING
81.
PRIVACY, SECURITY, AND THE NEW ECONOMY IN A WORLD OF CROSS-BORDER DATA FLOWs 6

(2015); Carla L. Reyes, WTO-Compliant Protection of Fundamental Rights: Lessons from the EU
Privacy Directive, MELB. J. INT'L L., June 2011, at 1, 32.
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protection.8 2 Similarly, in the Understanding on Commitments in
Financial Services, Members agree to not "prevent transfers of
information or the processing of financial information, including
transfers of data by electronic means." 8 3

However, the above rules

only apply to services that fall within the scope of financial and
telecommunications sectors; cross-border data flows for digital
services in other sectors, including audiovisual services, computer and
related services, and advertising services, are not explicitly protected.
Finally, under the Work Programme, the WTO Members have
renewed the moratorium on customs duties on electronic
transmissions several times. 84
Lee Tuthill argues that the existing provisions in the GATS are
sufficient to address measures restricting cross-border data flows for
various reasons. First, a data localization requirement constitutes a
"commercial presence" requirement under the GATS; thus, if WTO
Members have not inscribed any limitations in Mode 3 supply in the
relevant sectors, they would be in breach of national treatment
obligations.8 5 Second, building on the views of Holger Hestermeyer
and Laura Nielsen, 86 Tuthill argues that data localization
requirements could be considered to be a local content requirement
(i.e., using local servers and resources).8 7
Because most WTO
Members have not listed limitations for local content in their schedule
of commitments for most information and communication technology
services, these restrictions would be caught by the GATS. 88 Finally, if
nothing else, data localization requirements would be covered under
the GATS provision on domestic regulation (Article VI:1).89
On the other hand, Hosuk Lee-Makiyama argues that because
the GATS was intended to liberalize voice communications (e.g., under
the Annex on Telecommunications) rather than data transfers, it will
82.
Tuthill, supra note 18, at 367; see GATS, supra note 19, Annex on
Telecommunications, ¶ 5(c), (d).
83.
Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services ¶ B.3(c), Apr. 15 1994,
Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1261, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/
serve/21-fine.htm [https://perma.cc/DJ66-72PJ]; see also id. ¶ B.8 (safeguarding the "right of a
Member to protect personal data, personal privacy and the confidentiality of individual records
and accounts so long as such right is not used to circumvent the provisions of the Agreement").
84.
Many scholars have argued that the "practicality" of the moratorium is
"questionable" because most WTO Members will find it difficult to distinguish between domestic
and cross-border data flows. See, e.g., Lee-Makiyama, supra note 18, at 163.
85.
Tuthill, supra note 18, at 371.
86.
See Holger P. Hestermeyer & Laura Nielsen, The Legality of Local Content Measures
Under WTO Law, 48 J. WORLD TRADE 553, 588 (2014).
87.
Tuthill, supra note 18, at 371.
88.
Id.
89.
See id. at 372.
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be largely ineffective in the context of the Internet. 90 Legal obligations
on nondiscriminatory cross-border data flows are subject to the
specific commitments undertaken by the country in several sectors,
including the telecommunications sector and computer and related
services. In light of the fact that the classification of most modern day
digital services is not crystal clear (although the GATS is theoretically
applicable to measures restricting cross-border data flows), the lack of
horizontal commitment on cross-border data flows under the GATS,
coupled with the complexity in classification of digital services, makes
the nature of legal commitments on cross-border data flows uncertain.
As later discussed in Part III.A.3, the legal obligations on cross-border
data flows are also subject to broad general exceptions under GATS

Article XIV and XIVbis.
Moreover, temporary measures such as the WTO moratorium
on customs duties on electronic transmissions may also turn out to be
insufficient in the age of smart technologies and geolocation
software. 91 Briefly, the said moratorium was implemented to prohibit
customs duties on the transmission of data but not the content of
data.92 However, since the content of a digital product is represented
by the digital codes that are transferred via the Internet, the
distinction between taxing content and transmission may become
ambiguous. For instance, if a tax is imposed on a digital service (e.g.,
Google's search engine), it is unclear whether it constitutes a tax on
data flows (which is impermissible under the moratorium) or a tax on
the services provided by Google (which is subject to a country's
commitments under the GATS). Further, the widespread adoption of
geolocation software might theoretically make it possible in the future
Lee-Makiyama, supra note 18, at 164.
90.
Id. at 163. Given the globally networked nature of the Internet, data flows are not
91.
linear but rather flow through the most efficient path, making it harder for governments to
predict or estimate the exact location and path of data flows without interfering with the
network. See RAVI MALHOTRA, IP ROUTING 13-14 (Jim Sumser ed., 2002); Dennis D. Hirsch, In
Search of the Holy Grail: Achieving Global Privacy Rules Through Sector-Based Codes of
Conduct, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 1029, 1037 (2013). For example, a digital service provider in country A
serving consumers in country A may use cloud computing services that have servers located in
country B (realistically, it is very likely that a company in country A would be accessing multiple
servers in different countries). If the data collected by the service provider in country A are
transferred to a server in country B, and then retransferred pursuant to a request from a

consumer in country A, does that constitute a cross-border supply of a service? In other words,
can customs duties be imposed on such data flows?
The majority of restrictions on Internet-based services are generally not customs
92.
duties but regulatory measures within the borders of a country-for example, measures related
to privacy. See Aaditya Mattoo & Ludger Schuknecht, Trade Policies for Electronic Commerce 4
2000),
2380,
No.
Paper
Working
Grp.,
Research
Dev.
Bank
(World
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/164411468767105932/pdf/multi-page.pdf
[https://perma.cclYZ3U-8CXC].
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for countries to track data flows and levy a "byte tax" on foreign
companies when digital data crosses borders. 93 Such a tax also has
deeper implications, such as compromising the privacy of individual
users (because eventually governments will be taxing on the basis of
the location of the users) and, at a broader level, interference with the
free flow of information via the Internet.
3. Application of GATS Exceptions to Measures Affecting Digital
Trade
A stable and coherent regulatory framework is essential for the
regulation of both economic and sociocultural activities on the
Internet. While countries should ideally not impose disproportionate
restrictions on cross-border data transfer and thereby inhibit
electronic commerce, certain important policy considerations such as
privacy, cybersecurity, protection of online users, prevention of
cybercrimes, and protection of public morals may be equally important
to safeguard the Internet. Tuthill argues that the language available
in general exceptions is sufficient to carve out limitations for data
flows on security and privacy rationales. 9 4 Similarly, Daniel Crosby
argues that the language in GATS Article XIV is sufficient to justify
restrictions on data flows (e.g., data localization measures) on grounds
of privacy and data protection. 95
The application of the exceptions in GATS Articles XIV and
XIVbis, however, is not as straightforward.
Andrew Mitchell and
Jarrod Hepburn argue that the application of both these exceptions to
justify measures restricting flows of data necessitates an extensive
and sophisticated legal analysis that would require WTO tribunals to
consider issues such as the technical feasibility of the measure, the
manner of operation of the measure, the extent to which other
technical alternatives might be available to achieve equivalent levels
of security and privacy, and the resources available domestically.96 In
turn, this complicated legal analysis increases the level of legal
uncertainty regarding Members' measures to regulate the Internet or

93.
See, e.g., Boris Groendahl, You Think Google Search Is Free? Austria Seeks to Tax It
Anyway, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 28, 2017, 11:00 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/201704-29/you-think-google-search-is-free-austria-seeks-to-tax-it-anyway
[https://perma.cc/SLD3BBQ4] (discussing a recent proposal by Austria to impose a byte tax on digital transmissions).
94.
Tuthill, supra note 18, at 380.
95.
DANIEL CROSBY, ANALYSIS OF DATA LOCALIZATION MEASURES UNDER WTO SERVICES
TRADE RULES AND COMMITMENTS 9 (2016).

96.
Mitchell & Hepburn, supra note 18, at 201-04. See generally W. Kuan Hon et al.,
Policy, Legal and Regulatory Implications of a Europe-Only Cloud, 24 INT'L J.L. & INFO. TECH.
251 (2016).
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electronic commerce. Further, the language in GATS Article XIV may
not cover all types of cybersecurity threats-particularly when the
measure is not directly related to a war or a national emergency.9 7
Sacha Wunsch-Vincent and Arno Hold argue that the exceptions in
GATS Articles XIV and XIVbis only "tolerate" derogations from GATS
legal obligations on grounds of privacy, data protection, and consumer
protection, while essentially these factors are "necessary conditions for
spurring digital trade." 98
The application of general exceptions for privacy, consumer
protection, and consumer fraud is designed from the perspective of
international trade law, meaning it ensures WTO Members retain
regulatory autonomy on issues pertinent to enforcement of domestic
law. 99 However, these exceptions may be unable to address all aspects
of data flow restrictions. A measure that is discriminatory, arbitrary,
or a disguised restriction on trade (as under the chapeau in GATS
Article XIV) may nonetheless be essential to preserve trust and
integrity of the Internet. For example, a measure may prevent or
impose additional requirements on the import of digital products from
countries with very poor records of cybersecurity or a known history of
extensive government surveillance through forced technology
Further, countries may also impose certain technical
transfers.
standards to protect consumers (e.g., mandatory requirements for
privacy or security by design in digital products) even though these
measures may have the effect of restricting imports of digital services
from certain countries. 100 In the Authors' view, strict scrutiny of these
measures under international trade law may lead to unsatisfactory
outcomes because GATS Articles XIV and XIVbis are limited in scope
and do not facilitate consideration of Internet trust issues holistically.
Since electronic commerce is built on the foundation of a strong,
reliable, and trustworthy Internet, issues of online consumer
97.

GATS, supra note 19, art. XIVbis:1(b)(iii).

Wunsch-Vincent & Hold, supra note 18, at 205; accord INT'L DIG. ECON. ALL., THE
TRILLION DOLLAR QUESTION: How TRADE AGREEMENTS CAN MAXIMISE THE ECONOMIC
POTENTIAL OF DATA IN THE NETWORKED ECONOMY AND SUPPORT THE INTERNET AS THE WORLD'S
TRADING PLATFORM 2, 3, 6 (2013).
98.

See GATS, supranote 19, art. XIV(c).
99.
For example, the EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) recognizes privacy
100.
and security by design. See Commission Regulation 2016/679, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1; Sabba
Mahmood & Leonie Power, Getting to Know the General Data Protection Regulation,
Part 6-Designing for Compliance, FIELDFISHER: PRIVACY L. BLOG (Jan. 5, 2016, 6:10 PM),
http://privacylawblog.fieldfisher.com/2016/getting-to-know-the-general-data-protectionLouise
Dana
[https://perma.cc/2KFD-NTEY];
regulation-part-6-designing-for-compliance/
Simberkoff, Privacy and Security by Design: The New Default Under GDPR, AVEPOINT: BLOG
(Aug. 17, 2016), https://www.avepoint.com/blog/avepoint-blog/privacy-and-security-by-designgdpr/ [https://perma.cc/U9SR-3HY6].
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protection,
privacy,
data
protection,
and cybersecurity
are
fundamental in creating a global marketplace.
Recent PTAs and
informal proposals submitted to the WTO take these factors into
consideration and propose considerable changes and additions to the
existing framework of the GATS.
4. WTO Dispute Settlement Is Not Sufficiently Used for Digital Trade
Disputes
Despite the increasing number of regulatory barriers in digital
trade, the dispute settlement of the WTO has been used sparingly to
address such measures. 101
The reluctance to use the dispute
settlement system is not only due to the existing deficiencies in the
GATS (as described in the previous Sections) but is also related to the
complex political economy of digital trade. As described in Parts I and
II, electronic commerce is cross-cutting in nature, not only affecting
international trade but also touching upon delicate political issues
such as human rights, Internet governance,
and economic
development. Due to the uncertainty surrounding how WTO rules
apply to digital trade, many Members are reluctant to bring digital
trade disputes before the WTO (e.g., challenging a ban on a search
engine like Google or a social networking service like Facebook) as
such a dispute might adversely affect domestic regulation on online
censorship, data protection, and even Internet governance. 102 Further,
Members that adopt a guarded or interventionist approach in
electronic commerce regulation tend to be warier of the limits of the
GATS framework in taking account of domestic policy concerns (e.g.,
addressing privacy or consumer protection concerns or protecting
public order). 10 3
Consequently, other solutions are sought-for
101.
See generally China-Publications and Entertainment Products Appellate Body
Report, supra note 78 (dealing with restrictions placed by China on importation and circulation
of publications and audiovisual content, including in electronic form); US-Gambling Appellate
Body Report, supra note 68 (dealing with the US domestic law restrictions on cross-border
supply of gambling and betting services); Panel Report, China-Certain Measures Affecting
Electronic Payment Services, WTO Doc. WT/DS413/R (adopted Aug. 31, 2012) (dealing with the
restrictions placed by China on foreign electronic payment service providers); Mexico-Telecoms
Panel Report, supra note 71 (involving a case not directly related to electronic services but to the
interconnection between Mexican and US telecommunications networks).
102.
See, e.g., Claude Barfield, China's Internet Censorship: A WTO Challenge Is Long
Overdue, AM. ENTERPRISE INST. (Apr. 29, 2016), http://www.aei.org/publication/chinas-internetcensorship-a-wto-challenge-is-long-overdue/ [https://perma.cc/X4RU-3VQZ] (discussing China's
ban of Google); see also Nithin Coca, The Missing Trade War Against China's Digital
Protectionism, ENGADGET (Sept. 15, 2017), https://www.engadget.com/2017/09/15/china-digitalprotectionism-firewall-trade/ [https://perma.cc/7S7Y-3DTR].
103.
Relatedly, negotiations of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership
(TTIP) revealed the European Union's reluctance to negotiate on standards of data protection in
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example, negotiating bilateral solutions such as the Privacy Shield
between the European Union and the United States or relevant rules
in PTAs within a smaller group of like-minded countries. 104
B. Bridging the Gaps Between the GATS and PTAs
In contrast to the slow progress at the WTO, provisions on
electronic commerce are increasingly becoming mainstream in PTAs.
PTAs can be useful in transposing "domestic regulatory approaches to
trading partners," as was seen in the early US free trade agreements
(FTAs) with Chile and Singapore.1 0 Most of these early US PTAs,
limited
geographically
and
"minimal
achieved
however,
harmonization" and remained "incapable of addressing the key digital
trade challenges and of ensuring free digital flows globally."10 6 Brian
Bieron and Usman Ahmed argue that the Electronic Commerce
Chapters in these PTAs "[took] a very narrow view of the issues that
they have sought to tackle."10 7 As discussed earlier in Part III.A.3,
recent PTAs contain deeper and more comprehensive provisions on
digital trade. For example, the TPP contains several new provisions
to address the twin objectives of its Electronic Commerce
Chapter-namely, "promot[ing] consumer confidence in electronic
commerce" and removing "unnecessary barriers" to electronic
These developments indicate that the role and
commerce. 108
contribution of PTAs to the international legal framework for digital
trade is growing. However, given the haphazard and often conflicting
nature of rules on digital trade across different PTAs, 109 these rules
can also potentially fragment and disrupt the global framework for
digital trade.

trade agreements. See, e.g., James Fontanella-Khan, Data Protection Ruled out of EU-US Trade
Talks, FIN. TIMES (Nov. 5, 2013), https://www.ft.com/content/92al4dd2-44b9-11e3-a75100144feabdcO [https://perma.cc/R6W4-GLGA]; see also Eur. Comm'n, Exchanging and Protecting
Personal Data in a Globalised World, at 6, COM (2017) 7 final (Jan. 10, 2017).
Burri, supra note 2, at 343-44.
104.
Wunsch-Vincent, supra note 13, at 33.
105.
Burri, supranote 2, at 347.
106.
Brian Bieron & Usman Ahmed, Regulating E-Commerce Through International
107.
Policy: Understanding the International Trade Law Issues of E-Commerce, 46 J. WORLD TRADE
545, 545 (2012).
TPP Agreement, supra note 35, art. 14.2(1); see also Agreement Between Japan and
108.
an Economic Partnership, Japan-Mong., art. 9.1(2), Mar. 10, 2015 [hereinafter
for
Mongolia
http://www.mofa.go.jp/ao/cm2/mn/page3e_000298.html
EPA],
Japan-Mongolia
[https://perma.cc/ZPQ5-YSW3].
See Huang, supra note 52, at 319; Monteiro & Teh, supra note 51, at 71. See
109.
generally Sanjay Notani & Rishab Raturi, A PlurilateralE-Commerce Agreement: Skirting the
"Doha"Impasse, 12 GLOBAL TRADE & CUSTOMS J. 277 (2017).
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1. Addressing New-Age Digital Trade Issues in PTAs
Generally, the provisions of the Electronic Commerce Chapters
in PTAs tend to be more liberalizing because, unlike the GATS, they
introduce horizontal disciplines on electronic commerce applicable
across all sectors of the economy. Further, many PTAs contain a
"ratchet mechanism" that increases the degree of liberalization.1 1 0
However, broadly worded nonconforming measures and sectoral
exemptions in the Electronic Commerce Chapter (e.g., health, finance,
and public services) can deteriorate the extent of liberalization
achieved through PTAs. Further, certain PTAs (most prominently,
EU and Asian FTAs) contain less comprehensive disciplines on
electronic commerce.'
Some of the most important disciplines on
electronic commerce introduced in recent PTAs (particularly aimed at
addressing gaps in the GATS) include the following:
(i)
Customs duties on electronic transmissions: Many PTAs
impose a permanent moratorium on customs duties on
electronic transmissions, thus overcoming a major deficiency of
the GATS. Internal taxes may, however, still be imposed on
cross-border
electronic
transmissions. 112
This
may
disadvantage suppliers of foreign digital services and interfere
with the integrity of the internet as a free, global marketplace.
(ii)
Nondiscrimination: Many PTAs (particularly those following a
US-style
negative
listing
approach)
contain
strong
nondiscrimination (i.e., both national treatment and MFN)
obligations in relation to electronic commerce-unlike the
GATS, where national treatment is subject to the individual
commitments of the country. The recent US and Japanese
proposals before the Work Programme also recommend
extending national treatment to electronic commerce in WTO
law. 113 However, an extensive list of nonconforming measures
in the Electronic Commerce or Trade in Services Chapters may
substantially negate the effect of this provision. 114
For
example, under the Australia-United States Free Trade
Agreement
(AUSFTA),
comprehensive
nonconforming
110.
Herman, supra note 14, at 19-20.
111.
See WU, supra note 75, at 7-8; Huang, supra note 52, at 320-22. As of 2017,
moreover, no least developed country has signed a PTA with an Electronic Commerce Chapter.
See WU, supra note 75, at 7.
112.
See, e.g., United States-Chile Free Trade Agreement, Chile-U.S., art. 15.1(2), June 6,
2003 [hereinafter US-Chile FTA], https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/chilefta/final-text [https://perma.cc/B25X-VRK].
113.
See discussion infra Part IV.A.
114.
Wunsch-Vincent & Hold, supra note 18, at 201-02.
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(iii)

measures were set out in relation to audiovisual services,
which effectively reduces cross-border trade in several digital
content services.1 15
Cross-border data flows and data localization: Unlike the
GATS, few PTAs contain provisions that directly deal with
The TPP
cross-border data flows in electronic commerce.
contains provisions mandating cross-border flows of data and
banning data localization measures, although both of these
provisions are subject to an exception for legitimate public
policy purposes.1 16 The Japan-Mongolia Economic Partnership
Agreement (EPA) also imposes a prohibition on data
localization measures,' 17 although there is no binding legal
obligation for cross-border information flows.11

(iv)

1099

MODERNIZING INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW

8

The TPP

Electronic Commerce Chapter is not applicable to financial
services and government services. Some countries in the TISA
negotiations have also recommended similarly worded
Previously, the KORUS FTA contained a
provisions.
nonbinding provision to enable cross-border data flows between
Korea and the United States. 119 Further, both the KORUS
FTA and the European Union-South Korea Free Trade
Agreement (the "EU-Korea FTA")1 20 contain a provision in
their Financial Services Chapter to enable transfer of data
processing required in the "ordinary course of business." 12 1
However, unlike the KORUS FTA, the EU-Korea FTA contains
a strong safeguard for "protection of privacy, in particular with
22
regard to the transfer of personal data."1
Privacy and data protection: Several of the recent PTAs
acknowledge the importance of privacy and data protection
For example, the
measures in electronic commerce.
ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Agreement

Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement, Austl.-U.S., art. 16.4(4), May 18,
115.
2004 [hereinafter AUSFTA], https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/australianfta/final-text [https://perma.cc/U2PM-GVYN].
See, e.g., TPP Agreement, supra note 35, arts. 14.11, 14.13.
116.
Japan-Mongolia EPA, supra note 108, art. 9.10.
117.
Id. art. 9.12(5); see also Tratado de Libre Comercio Entre Los Estados Unidos
118.
Apr. 3, 2014,
art. 14.10,
de Panami, Mex.-Pan.,
Mexicanos y la Repdiblica
http://www.sice.oas.org/TPD/MEX_- PAN/DraftMEXPANFTAs/Index PDF_09.05.2014_s.asp.
KORUS, supra note 16, art. 15.8.
119.
Free Trade Agreement Between the European Union and Its Member States, of the
120.
One Part, and the Republic of Korea, of the Other Part, Sept. 16, 2010, 2011 O.J. (L 127) 6
https://eur-lex.europa.eullegal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=
FTA],
EU-Korea
[hereinafter
OJ:L:2011:127:FULL&from=EN [https://perma.cc/L45X-GZYA].
Id. art. 7.43(a); KORUS, supra note 16, Annex 13-B, § B.
121.
122.
EU-Korea FTA, supranote 120, art. 7.43(b).
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(AANZFTA) 12 3 and the China-South Korea Free Trade
Agreement (the "China-Korea FTA") impose a general
obligation to protect the personal information of electronic
commerce users. 124 In the EU-Korea FTA, the parties "agree
that the development of electronic commerce must be fully
compatible with the international standards of data protection,
in order to ensure the confidence of users of electronic
commerce." 125 Both the TPP and the Japan-Mongolia EPA
require parties to adopt a legal framework of protection of
personal information; although, under the TPP, the legal
framework is defined very broadly to include "comprehensive
privacy, personal information or personal data protection laws,
sector-specific laws covering privacy, or laws that provide for
the enforcement of voluntary undertakings by enterprises
relating to privacy." 126 The approach in the TPP is different
from that in the EU-Korea FTA, which specifically refers to
international standards on data protection as laid down by the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD). 127
However, under the TPP, parties are also
encouraged to develop mechanisms to promote compatibility
between the privacy regimes of different members (e.g.,
through mutual arrangements or an international framework),
thus acknowledging that the lack of interoperability of
domestic regimes of partner countries is a barrier to digital
trade. 128 Additionally, the TPP and Japan-Mongolia EPA also
prohibit forced disclosure of source code; this provision not only
protects vital digital assets of companies but also prevents

123.
Agreement Establishing the ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Area,
signed 27 February 2009, [2010] A.T.S. 1 (entered into force January 2010) [hereinafter
AANZFTA].
124.
Free Trade Agreement Between the Government of the People's Republic of China
and the Government of the Republic of Korea, China-S. Kor., art. 13.5, June 1, 2015 [hereinafter
China-Korea FTA], http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/topic/enkorea.shtml [https://perma.ccYW9Q-WXT8];
AANZFTA, supra note 123, ch. 10, art. 7(1).
125.
EU-Korea FTA, supra note 120, art. 7.48(2).
126.
TPP Agreement, supra note 35, art. 14.8(2) n.6.
127.
EU-Korea FTA, supra note 120, art. 7.43(b) n.41; see OECD Guidelines on the
Protection
of
Privacy
and
Transborder
Flows
of
Personal
Data,
ORG.

FOR

ECON.

CO-OPERATION

&

DEV.,

http://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/

oecdguidelinesontheprotectionofprivacyandtransborderflowsofpersonaldata.htm
[https://perma.cc/XN9Z-2W4L] (last visited Mar. 30, 2018); cf. U.S.-Jordan Joint Statement on ECommerce,

Jordan-U.S.,

http://www.sice.oas.org/Trade/us-jrd/St.Ecomm.pdf

[https://perma.cc/B8XS-LX38] (endorsing the OECD's data protection standards to "guide the
development of electronic commerce").
128.
See TPP Agreement, supra note 35, art. 14.8(5).

(v)

(vi)
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governments from conducting unauthorized surveillance on the
activities of Internet users. 129
Consumer confidence enhancing measures: Several PTAs
contain provisions aimed at enhancing the confidence of
electronic commerce consumers, such as provisions related to
electronic signatures and authentication, measures to enable
consumer protection, measures to enable paperless trading,
Particularly with respect to online consumer
and others.
protection, several PTAs require at least cooperation between
partner countries 1 30 or mandate the adoption of a legal
framework for consumer protection pertaining to online
Certain PTAs also refer to
commercial activities. 131
international standards such as the 2003 OECD Guidelines for
Protecting Consumers from Fraudulent and Deceptive
Commercial Practices Across Borders 32 and the UNCITRAL
Model Law on Electronic Commerce.13 3
Cybersecurity and spam control: Cybersecurity concerns have
become important in recent years, particularly with increased
threats of malware and spam attacks, massive data breaches,
and, more recently, theft of trade secrets and disruption of
critical infrastructure in certain countries. Cybersecurity is
Recent
also closely aligned with national security issues.
PTAs, such as the TPP and the Japan-Mongolia EPA, contain
provisions to encourage greater interstate cooperation on
cybersecurity issues and spam control. 134 For instance, outside
of the Electronic Commerce Chapter, the TPP also sets out
provisions on promoting innovation in encryption in technology

See id. art. 14.17; Japan-Mongolia EPA, supra note 108, art. 9.11.
129.
E.g., EU-Korea FTA, supra note 120, art. 7.49(1)(d); KORUS, supra note 16, art.
130.
15.5; see also Japan-Mongolia EPA, supra note 108, art. 9.6 (recognizing the importance of
cooperation

between

countries

to

enhance

consumer

protection

but not

requiring

such

cooperation); AUSFTA, supra note 115, art. 16.6 (same).
E.g., TPP Agreement, supra note 35, art. 14.8(2); AANZFTA, supra note 123, ch. 10,
131.
art. 6; see also Agreement Between Australia and Japan for an Economic Partnership,
Austl.-Japan., art. 13.7, signed 8 July 2014, [2015] A.T.S. 2 (entered into force 15 January 2015)
[hereinafter Japan-Australia EPA] (recognizing the importance of adopting such a framework).
AUSFTA, supra note 115, art. 14.6(2)(b).
132.
TPP Agreement, supra note 35, art. 14.5; see also Free Trade Agreement Between
133.
the Government of Australia and the Government of the People's Republic of China,
Austl.-China, art. 12.8(2), signed 17 June 2015, [2015] A.T.S. 15 (entered into force 20 December
2015) [hereinafter CHAFTA].
TPP Agreement, supra note 35, art. 14.16; Japan-Mongolia EPA, supra note 108,
134.
arts. 9.7, 9.12(2). For spam coverage, see also Japan-Australia EPA, supra note 131, art.
13.10(2); EU-Korea FTA, supra note 120, art. 7.49(1)(c); AANZFTA, supra note 123, ch. 10, art.
9(1)(c).
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products1 3 5 and criminalizes the theft of trade secrets. 136 None
of these provisions are currently contained in WTO
agreements, although recent proposals at the WTO have raised
many of these issues.1 3 7
Enabling regional and international cooperation: Several PTAs
aim to foster cooperation on a range of issues affecting
electronic commerce, including recognition of electronic
signatures, resolving online disputes related to electronic
commerce, liability of Internet intermediaries, consumer
protection, addressing cybercrimes, development of technical
standards, and promotion of digital SMEs. 138 Other bodies
such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the
OECD have also played an instrumental role in developing
policies and guidelines on several of the above issues. 139 In the
PTA between Japan and Switzerland, for example, the parties
agreed to "cooperate in relevant international organisations
and fora to contribute to the development of the international
framework for electronic commerce." 140
While these
mechanisms operate on political goodwill, they are essential for
countries to develop a shared understanding of concerns as well
as to provide technical assistance to trading partners as and
when necessary (e.g., provisions related to providing assistance
to SMEs14 1 or knowledge-sharing on developing regulations on
privacy, cybersecurity, consumer signature, e-government, and
signatures). 142
However, interstate cooperation is also

135.
TPP Agreement, supra note 35, Annex 8-B.
136.
Id. art. 18.78.
137.
See discussion infra Part IV.
138.
TPP Agreement, supra note 35, art. 14.15; Japan-Mongolia EPA, supra note 108, art.
9.12; EU-Korea FTA, supra note 120, art. 7.49; AANZFTA, supra note 123, ch. 10, art. 9; USChile FTA, supra note 112, art. 15.5.
139.
See, e.g., Asia-Pac. Econ. Cooperation [APEC], Arrangement for Cross-BorderPrivacy
Enforcement, 1 1, 2010/SOM1/ECSG/DPS/013
(Feb. 28, 2010) [hereinafter CPEA],
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cooperation-agreements/100719apec.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2XC8-YNTN]; ASIA-PAC. ECON. COOPERATION, PRIVACY FRAMEWORK 4 (2005)
[hereinafter APEC PRIVACY FRAMEWORK], https://www.apec.org/Publications/2005/12/APECPrivacy-Framework
[https://perma.cc/J9ZW-6KQW];
OECD
Privacy Guidelines (2013),
http://www.oecd.org/internet/ieconomy/privacy-guidelines.htm
[https://perma.cc/4BMQ-DHXX]
(last visited Mar. 30, 2018); ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., GUIDELINES FOR CONSUMER
PROTECTION
IN
THE
CONTEXT
OF
ELECTRONIC
COMMERCE
10
(2000),

http://www.oecd.org/stilconsumer/34023811.pdf [https://perma.cc/7E8M-Z4C2].
140.
Agreement on Free Trade and Economic Partnership Between Japan and the Swiss
Confederation, Japan-Switz., art. 82(4), Feb. 19, 2009, 2642 U.N.T.S 3.
141.
See, e.g., TPP Agreement, supra note 35, art.14.15(a).
142.
See, e.g., id. art. 14.15(b).
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sometimes viewed as a tool for powerful countries to exert
143
pressure on their weaker trading partners.
Thus, generally speaking, disciplines in PTAs progress
significantly over the WTO legal framework on electronic commerce by
(a) addressing issues which are pending from the Work Programme;
(b) enabling greater regulatory cooperation, coordination, or mutual
recognition arrangements, or at least enhancing dialogue between
partner countries on regulatory measures, all of which act as barriers
to digital trade; (c) enhancing prospects for digital innovation by
protecting vital digital assets of technology companies; and (d)
fostering means by which trading partners can provide technical
assistance and share knowledge on issues of digital trade.

2. Conflict Between Electronic Commerce Chapters in PTAs and the

GATS
The potential conflict between the Electronic Commerce
Chapter of PTAs and WTO agreements such as the GATS has received
very little academic attention. 144 This is not surprising, as several
PTAs do not contain binding provisions in their Electronic Commerce
Chapter and, further, because the dispute settlement process is often
45
not applicable to the Electronic Commerce Chapter of PTAs.1
However, under the TPP and other recent FTAs, the dispute
settlement process is applicable to the Electronic Commerce
Several studies highlight that the dispute settlement
Chapter.146
system in PTAs (where available) has been sparingly used compared
Further, while most developing country
to that of the WTO. 1 4 7

Sungjoon Cho & Jilrgen Kurtz, International Cooperation and Organizational
143.
Identities: The Evolution of the ASEAN Investment Regime, 37 Nw. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 173,
176-77 (2017); Drahos, supra note 24, at 9.
However, the intricate relationship between WTO agreements and PTAs has been
144.
the subject of extensive scholarship in international trade law and policy. See Jennifer Hillman,
Conflicts Between Dispute Settlement Mechanisms in Regional Trade Agreements and the
WTO-What Should the WTO Do?, 42 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 193, 194 (2009).
EU PTAs, for example, generally exclude application of dispute settlement processes
145.
to the Electronic Commerce Chapter. For examples of PTAs containing such provisions, see
AANZFTA, supra note 123, ch. 17, art. 3; KORUS, supra note 16, art. 22.4; AUSFTA, supra note
115, art. 21.2. But see Association Agreement Between the European Union and Its Member
States, of the One Part, and Ukraine, of the Other Part, May 29, 2014, art. 322(1), [2014] O.J. (L
161) 3 (applying a dispute settlement procedure to, inter alia, disputes arising out of electronic
commerce).

See TPP Agreement, supra note 35, art. 14.18. As of 2017, not a single dispute has
146.
arisen under the Electronic Commerce Chapter of any relevant PTAs.
See, e.g., Nguyen Tan Son, Towards a Compatible Interaction Between Dispute
147.
Settlement Under the WTO and Regional Trade Agreements, 5 MACQUARIE J. Bus. L. 113, 119
(2008).
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Members usually rely on the WTO dispute settlement system,
developed country Members tend to prefer the relevant PTA tribunal
in case of a dispute. 148
A large number of scholars support the use of the WTO over
PTAs to settle trade disputes for various reasons, including the
multilateral, representative nature of the WTO vis-A-vis the more
"6power oriented" nature of PTAs; the long successful experience of the
WTO dispute settlement system in resolving trade disputes; and the
refined nature of the WTO dispute resolution procedures that allow
the possibility of third-party participation in the WTO and an
established appellate mechanism. 149 Others take the view that a
synergistic relationship is possible between the respective dispute
settlement mechanisms of the WTO and the PTAs. 150 Given that a
larger number of PTAs contain specific rules on electronic commerce
(or lex specialis), it is possible to argue that more complainants may
resort to PTA tribunals despite the obvious advantages of the WTO
dispute settlement system.
Typically, complainants are likely to
consider several factors in choosing the forum, including the
applicable rules to the measure at issue, the nature of the relationship
with the PTA trading partners, and the nature of remedies available
under the PTA vis-A-vis the WTO.
An overlap in jurisdiction of the WTO and the PTA tribunals on
disputes pertaining to electronic commerce is likely to give rise to
interesting and complex questions. 15 1
For example, can the
148.

James H. Cassing, Trade Dispute Diversion: The Economics of Conflicting Dispute

Settlement Procedures Between Regional Trade Agreements and the WTO, in 17 FRONTIERS OF
ECONOMICS AND GLOBALIZATION 303, 306 (Hamid Beladi & E. Kwan Choi eds., 2009); Drahos,

supra note 24, at 3, 6.
149.
Cassing, supra note 148, at 327; Peter Drahos, Weaving Webs of Influence: The
United States, Free Trade Agreements and Dispute Resolution, 41 J. WORLD TRADE 191, 191
(2007).
150.
See, e.g., MALEBAKENG AGNES FORERE, THE RELATIONSHIP OF WTO LAW AND
REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS IN DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 223-32 (2015); Son, supra note 147, at

135.
151.
See MARC BACCHETTA ET AL., WORLD TRADE ORG., WORLD TRADE REPORT 2011: THE
WTO AND PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENTS: FROM CO-EXISTENCE TO COHERENCE 173 (2011).

Different PTAs contain different sets of rules for resolving jurisdiction overlap with WTO. See id.
at 187; Amelia Porges, Dispute Settlement, in PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENT POLICIES FOR

DEVELOPMENT: A HANDBOOK 809, 826 (Jean-Pierre Chauffour & Jean-Christophe Maur eds.,
2011). For example, while most PTAs allow the complaining party to choose a forum of its choice
(either a WTO or PTA tribunal), some PTAs may exclude the jurisdiction of the WTO either
partially (for example, Article 104 of NAFTA can be settled under Chapter 20 of that Agreement)
or completely with respect to issues covered by the rules of the PTA. Porges, supra, at 826.
Others, such as the EU-Chile FTA (Article 189(4)), necessitate the use of the WTO's dispute
settlement process when the subject matter of a dispute is covered by both PTA and WTO rules.
Id. at 862. Older PTAs typically do not have in place a comprehensive dispute settlement system,
while new-generation PTAs tend to emulate the WTO dispute settlement model. Id.
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enforcement of legal obligations in the Electronic Commerce Chapter
of the PTAs indirectly result in a violation of the GATS? What
happens if a specific measure is in violation of a PTA but is consistent
with the GATS, or vice versa? What happens when a WTO tribunal
has overlapping jurisdiction with a PTA tribunal on a dispute related
to electronic commerce? Should the more specific provisions in the
Electronic Commerce Chapter in the PTA be given precedence?
Further, to what extent will WTO law be relevant in the
interpretation of Electronic Commerce Chapters of PTAs? The way
these issues will be addressed and resolved will also be very critical in
facilitating security, predictability, and coherence in the global
framework for digital trade.
A conflict between Electronic Commerce Chapters in the PTAs
and the GATS creates a high degree of legal uncertainty in dispute
For example, if a PTA requires countries to adopt
settlement.
measures implementing a specific international standard on privacy
or consumer protection (e.g., adhering to the OECD or APEC
framework), what happens when such a measure is challenged before
the WTO by a non-PTA party? The WTO tribunal does not need to
consider the legal obligations under the specific PTA vis-A-vis a nonPTA party. 15 2 If the measure is found to be in violation of the GATS
(e.g., if it fails to satisfy GATS Article XIV), the respondent may be
required to modify its domestic laws, which might make the law
susceptible to legal challenge under the PTA. Alternatively, countries
that are likely to be in this position may engage in a series of bilateral
arrangements with major non-PTA trading partners to avoid such
complications, resulting in a complex web of regulations.
Both the WTO and PTA tribunals (depending on the forum
before which the complainant initiates the dispute) can contribute
toward "systemic integration" of international trade law, if only to a
limited extent. 153 If a trade dispute related to electronic commerce
arises between two parties that are also signatories of a PTA with a
comprehensive Electronic Commerce Chapter, the WTO tribunals may
take the relevant provisions in the PTA into account as a part of the
"relevant normative environment."15 4 For example, the WTO tribunal
See, e.g., Panel Report, Peru-Additional Duty on Imports of Certain Agricultural
152.
Products, TT 7.525-.528, WTO Doc. WT/DS457/R (adopted July 31, 2015).
See Locknie Hsu, Applicability of WTO Law in Regional Trade Agreements:
153.
Identifying the Links, in REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS AND THE WTO LEGAL SYSTEM 525, 560

(Lorand Bartels & Federico Ortino eds., 2006); Pamela Apaza Lanyi & Armin Steinbach,
Promoting Coherence Between PTAs and the WTO Through Systemic Integration, 21 J. INT'L
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
12-13),
(manuscript at
L.
(forthcoming 2018)
EcoN.
papers.cfm?abstract id=2905375.
See Lanyi & Steinbach, supra note 153 (manuscript at 3-4).
154.
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may take into account that an otherwise GATS-consistent data
localization measure may be specifically prohibited under the terms of
a PTA. On the other hand, WTO jurisprudence can also inform the
interpretation of provisions in Electronic Commerce Chapters in
PTAs. For example, the TPP prohibits its members from imposing
requirements on foreign companies to submit source code for their
digital products as a condition of market access, with certain
exceptions for critical infrastructure or information necessary under
the patent law of a member.1 55 Although a similar provision is
missing in the GATS, it is possible that under GATS Article XIV, a
member could argue that the modification of source code can be
"necessary to secure compliance" with domestic laws or regulations
(e.g., protecting data security and privacy or preventing malware in
commercial software products) 156-thus justifying digression from the
said TPP provision. Given that GATS Article XIV is incorporated
mutatis mutandis into the TPP, 15 7 the general exceptions in the GATS
can usefully inform the extent to which the exceptions for involuntary
provision of source code in the TPP might apply. Similarly, GATS
Articles XIV and XIVbis could also help define the "legitimate public
policy objectives" available to parties to justify measures that restrict
cross-border data transfers or impose data localization. 15 8
In the Authors' view, as legal provisions pertinent to electronic
commerce become more commonplace in PTAs (as appears to be the
trend), synergy between disciplines under the WTO and the PTAs will
be necessary to promote a secure and predictable framework for
digital trade. Although international trade tribunals can partially
address conflicts in the parallel trade regimes of PTAs and the GATS,
their capacity to do so is likely to be curtailed by conflicting rules in
Electronic Commerce Chapters of various PTAs coupled with the slow
progress of multilateral negotiations on electronic commerce. In the
future, it is likely that PTA parties may choose to apply dispute
settlement procedures to Electronic Commerce Chapters because of
the absence of relevant rules in the WTO law. For example, in the
case of renegotiated NAFTA and KORUS FTA, the proposed digital
trade provisions are highly likely to be subject to the dispute
resolution process (like those in the TPP). The same could be true in
the case of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership
(TTIP) or TISA. Of course, whether complainants would choose to
bring such disputes before the PTA tribunal would depend on a
155.
156.
157.
158.

TPP Agreement, supra note 35, art. 14.17(1).
See GATS, supra note 19, art. XIV(c).
TPP Agreement, supra note 35, art. 29.1(3).
E.g., id. arts. 14.11(3), 14.13(3).
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variety of factors, as discussed above. If rules on electronic commerce
in PTAs are incompatible with the multilateral framework (such as
under the GATS and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (the "TRIPS Agreement")), 1 5 9 then in the
long run, the global framework for digital trade may become
fragmented, thereby disrupting the seamless nature of a digital
economy.
3. Contribution of PTAs to the Digital Trade Regime
Provisions on electronic commerce in PTAs play an important
role in the creation of the international legal framework governing
digital trade. As previously discussed, due to the lex specialis nature
of provisions on electronic commerce in PTAs, such provisions are
increasingly significant when disputes arise between relevant PTA
Additionally, PTAs contribute to the development of
partners.
domestic law and policy. For example, the TPP requires all member
countries to enforce domestic laws on privacy 60 and online consumer
protection, 16 1 and bans data localization measures 162 and measures
mandating disclosure of source code. 163 Further, related obligations
under the Intellectual Property Chapter require TPP members to
adopt laws on criminalization of trade secret thefts 164 and Internet
intermediary liability. 165
The above policy developments are significant for the
multilateral system as well. In future trade negotiations at the WTO
or elsewhere, TPP parties are likely to demand provisions supporting
a more market-based approach (as is already evident in the TISA
negotiations), as compared to the more interventionist approach taken
by the European Union or the guarded approach of China. For
example, the privacy laws in Korea and the European Union are
potentially in conflict with the existing legal framework of the TPP. 16 6
159.
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S.
299.
TPP Agreement, supranote 35, art. 14.8(2).
160.
Id. art. 14.7.
161.
See id. art. 14.13(2).
162.
Id. art. 14.17.
163.
Id. art. 18.78.
164.
Id. art. 18.82.
165.
See Mitchell & Hepburn, supra note 18, at 186 & n.8. However, Korea recently joined
166.
the APEC Cross-Border Privacy Rules (CBPR) system to facilitate data transfers. See Elaine
Ramirez & George Lynch, South Korea Joins Asia-Pacific Data Transfer System, BLOOMBERG L.
(June 27, 2017), https://www.bna.com/south-korea-joins-n73014461300/ [https://perma.cc/C2WQ74P3].
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Similarly, many countries have adopted data localization policies that
do not adhere to the legal standards in the TPP, although they may
arguably be compatible with the GATS. In particular, the European
Union and China have been extremely reluctant to adopt legal
commitments on data localization. 1 6 7 Additionally, several developing
countries do not have in place a sound regulatory framework for
online privacy, consumer protection, and cybersecurity due to lack of
sufficient domestic knowledge and resources. Since the absence of
such regulations does not violate the GATS in any manner, many of
these countries do not have an incentive to support a comprehensive
TPP-type agenda. 168 Due to the divergence in provisions regulating
electronic commerce across PTAs, sole reliance on the PTA framework
for regulation of digital trade can be detrimental in the long run, as it
may reinforce ideological divides between countries and fragment the
international
legal framework
necessary
for global trading
activities. 169
Lior Herman argues that the formation of international trade
law on electronic commerce will be a product of "bottom-up
multilateralisation extend[ing] [PTAs'] e-commerce undertakings and
provisions to a larger number of trade partners" and "top-down
multilateralisation," which can "advance[] e-commerce provisions,
commitments and common learning at the WTO level." 1 0 PTAs can
perform the role of "experimental laboratories," especially given the
strong ideological divide between countries on several digital trade
issues.1 71 When a particular template is widely referred to or used in
the negotiation of other PTAs, it is likely to be more widely accepted at
the multilateral level.
Further, negotiation of PTAs provides an
opportunity for countries to identify both easy and challenging areas
for the future agenda on electronic commerce at the WTO, as well as
achieve a rough consensus on principles related to trade in the digital
economy. High-level principles proposed by the OECD, APEC, and
others have informed several PTAs initiated by developed countries

(e.g., the Japan-Mongolia EPA, TPP, and EU-Korea FTA).

The

United States has adopted the Digital Dozen principles, which inform
its PTA negotiations and include principles such as a free and open
Internet, prohibiting customs duties on digital products, preventing
discrimination, ensuring cross-border data flows and prohibition on

167.
See discussion infra Part IV.A.1.
168.
However, not all developing countries are opposed to an electronic commerce agenda.
See discussion infra Part IV.A.1.
169.
WU, supra note 75, at 28; Wunsch-Vincent & Hold, supra note 18, at 201-02.
170.
See Herman, supra note 14, at 4.
171.
Id. at 6.
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data localization, barring forced technology transfers, and promoting
choice of technology. 172 These principles could assist in the formation
of the multilateral framework for digital trade while also providing
autonomy to domestic governments to adopt domestic rules that are
best suited to their regulatory capacity and local needs.
However, certain developing countries (for instance, South
Africa and India) oppose the inclusion of electronic commerce in
international trade agreements. 173 In this regard, the negotiation of
the TISA may be an important first step in arriving at a consensus on
sensitive digital trade issues at a plurilateral level before attempting
to multilateralize those disciplines. In particular, the operation of
deep Electronic Commerce Chapters in these agreements will enable
developing countries to observe their costs and benefits and
accordingly prepare themselves before committing to an international
Conclusively, it is
trade agreement on electronic commerce.
emphasized that given the global nature of the digital economy, a
consistent legal framework is indispensable at the multilateral level;
however, in the short run, PTAs can help plug gaps in the GATS,
instigate development of new disciplines suited to the digital economy,
and generally advance the digital trade agenda among countries.
IV. REFORMING INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW

In the previous Parts, the Authors argue that the existing
international legal framework on digital trade is deficient in several
respects in addressing the important policy challenges of the modern
digital economy. Further, the network of PTAs only play a short-term,
complementary role to the multilateral system; thus, the trade regime
This Part identifies and
needs timely and meaningful reform.
avenues for reform of
and
areas
policy
significant
the
discusses
international trade law governing digital trade at the multilateral
level. First, the Authors discuss how and why the Work Programme
can facilitate deliberations on critical issues in digital trade, thereby
improving prospects for development of new rules at the WTO.

172.

See

OFFICE OF U.S.

TRADE

REPRESENTATIVE,

THE DIGITAL

2 DOZEN

(2017),

https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/Digital-2-Dozen-Updated.pdf [https://perma.cc/H4MV-X3FH].
See, e.g., Statement by the African Group, supra note 77, T 1.3; India Inc Says No to
173.
E-Commerce Talks in Meeting with WTO Chief, HINDU BUS. LINE (Mar. 18, 2018),
https://www.thehindubusinessline.com/economy/policy/india-inc-says-no-to-including-e23 29 39 42
.ece
commerce-in-wto-negotiations-in-meeting-with-wto-chief/article
[https://perma.cc/ZB7X-3CSL]; Kirtika Suneja, India Opposes E-Commerce Talks at WTO;
AM),
2017,
7:56
(Dec.
4,
TIMES
Document,
ECON.
Submits
https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/policy/india-opens-e-commerce-talks-at-wtosubmits-document/articleshow/61907459.cms [https://perma.cc/M4HE-QY35].
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Second, the Authors discuss three important areas or issues that
require policy action at the multilateral level-improving market
access, addressing regulatory barriers, and supporting developing
countries to integrate faster into the digital economy. Finally, the
Authors discuss the different avenues available for reform of
international trade law-developing a new agreement under the WTO
on electronic commerce, amending the GATS to include more relevant
disciplines on electronic commerce, and developing multilayered
institutional frameworks to deal with digital trade.
This Part
concludes that the multilateral framework of the WTO should remain
central in the development and reform of international trade law
governing electronic commerce. However, multilateral disciplines on
electronic commerce need to become more variegated and flexible in
order to accommodate the cross-cutting nature of the digital economy.
Patchy reforms within the existing structure of the GATS might be
inadequate, and WTO Members should aim to develop more
comprehensive and up-to-date rules on electronic commerce.
A. Evolution of the Work Programmeon Electronic Commerce
Although the Work Programme has made slow progress thus
far, it is perhaps the most important platform in a multilateral context
to deliberate on suitable rules for digital trade. In the Authors' view,
the progress of the Work Programme is dependent on promoting
dialogues on emerging and contemporary policy challenges of the
digital economy, which have also been outlined in several proposals
submitted to the WTO in recent months. On the other hand, outdated
or irrelevant issues persisting on the Work Programme agenda since
1998 should be put aside. For example, although some Members
demand a comprehensive and up-to-date definition of electronic
commerce, 174 this issue is largely futile as electronic commerce is a
broad, evolving economic activity. Rather, the extent to which the
scope of an Electronic Commerce Chapter is curtailed, either in
existing PTAs or in any future agreements of the WTO (e.g., exclusion
of financial or public sector), is more critical in the current context.
Similarly, the issue of classification of digital products has also
reached an impasse-namely, determining whether digital products
are goods, services, or both. WTO tribunals have not arrived at a
definitive distinction between goods and services, while several PTAs

174.
The existing WTO definition of "electronic commerce" is "production, distribution,
marketing, sale or delivery of goods and services by electronic means." See Work Programmeon
E-Commerce, supra note 2, ¶ 1.3.
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also take a contradictory stand on this issue. 175 The dilemma
regarding the classification of digital products resulted in a temporary
moratorium on imposing customs duties on electronic transmissions,
which has been renewed several times since 1999.176 Given that many
recent digital innovations combine different kinds of digital content
with both services and physical devices, the debate on the equivalence
of physical products (e.g., books and CDs containing programs or
music) and electronic products (e.g., downloadable e-books, music, or
software) is practically irrelevant in the digital age. Any proposals
aimed at addressing such issues, such as the Russian proposal
circulated in July 2017, only reinforce a very guarded approach and
could unnecessarily stall progress within the Work Programme.17 7 On
the other hand, more market-oriented proposals from the United
States and Japan suggesting the removal of customs duties on all
kinds of digital products (irrespective of the media or classification)
appear more pragmatic.1 7 8
The majority of the recent proposals on electronic commerce
circulated by WTO Members in recent years tend to focus on
regulatory barriers to digital trade. In particular, they emphasize
digital protectionism. Additionally, these proposals outline policy
areas for further discussion, reform, and regulatory cooperation in
order to achieve a more stable and coherent global framework for
electronic commerce. Further, some of these proposals (particularly
from developing country Members) add another important layer to the
ongoing work on electronic commerce: use of trade facilitation
measures to enable digital SMEs in developing countries, providing
technical assistance to developing country governments, and
improving trade finance opportunities for MSMEs. Some of the key
emerging policy areas in electronic commerce identified in the most
recent WTO proposals, which provide useful bases for future
See Stewart A. Baker et al., E-Products and the WTO, 35 INT'L LAW. 5, 6 (2001);
175.
James Munro, Pushing the Boundaries of 'Products'and 'Goods' Under GATT 1994: An Analysis
of the Coverage of New and Unorthodox Articles of Commerce, 47 J. WORLD TRADE 1323, 1324
(2013); Fiona Smith & Lorna Woods, A Distinction Without a Difference: Exploring the Boundary
Between Goods and Services in the World Trade Organization and the European Union, 12
COLUM. J. EUR. L. 1, 5 (2005); Tania Voon, A New Approach to Audiovisual Products in the WTO:
Rebalancing GATTand GATS, 14 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 1, 5 (2007).
See, e.g., World Trade Organization, Ministerial Decision of 19 December 2015, ¶ 3,
176.
WTO Doc. WT/MIN(15)/42, WT/L/977 (2015).
For the Russian proposal recommending to resolve the definition and scope of
177.
electronic commerce, see Communication from the Russian Federation, Ways to Move Forward,
WTO Doc. JOB/GC/131 (July 14, 2017) [hereinafter Ways to Move Forward].
See, e.g., Communication from Japan, Possible Way Forward on Electronic
178.
Commerce, Annex, WTO Doc. JOB/GC/130 (July 14, 2017); Non-Paper from the United States, T
2.1, WTO Doc. JOB/GC/94 (July 4, 2016).
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negotiations at the WTO, include cross-border data flows, building a
sound regulatory environment for electronic commerce, promoting
developing country interests, enhancing innovation in technical
standards, and institutional improvements.1 79
1. Cross-Border Data Flows
Several WTO Members have categorically identified the
importance of cross-border data flows and preventing discriminatory
measures such as data localization. For example, the US proposal
outlines that any barriers to the free flow of information "stifles
competition and disadvantages digital entrepreneurs" and is therefore
essential from the point of view of both technology companies and
consumers.18 0 Thus, trade rules should be designed to "combat such
discriminatory barriers by protecting the movement of data, subject to
reasonable safeguards like the protection of consumer data when
exported." 181
Similarly, Japan has shown strong support for
preventing "digital protectionism" 18 2 and promoting strong provisions
on cross-border data flows.

183

These proposals reflect a characteristic

market-oriented approach to electronic commerce regulation.
Data localization measures are one of the most common
regulatory tools used to block cross-border data transfers. 184
Therefore, unsurprisingly, the United States has been emphatic at the
WTO (and many other platforms) that data localization measures are
economically inefficient in the age of cloud computing and electronic
commerce.
Trade rules should "promote access to networks and
efficient data processing."1 85 The link between data processing and
digital trade is particularly relevant to enable big data processing.
Bans on data localization further ties in with the broader aim of
keeping the Internet free and open for "all legitimate commercial

179.
See, e.g., Non-Paper from the United States, supra note 178, TT 2.3, 2.11, 2.15. Not
all proposals are available online as they are JOB documents. This Section is thus developed
based on online-accessible proposals and press releases.
180.
Id. ¶ 2.3.
Id.
181.
182.
Non-Paper for the Discussions on Electronic Commerce/Digital Trade from Japan,
¶ 2.2, WTO Doc. JOB/GC/100 (July 25, 2016) [hereinafter Non-Paperfrom Japan].
183.
Id. ¶ 4.2B.
184.
CORY, supra note 45, at 2-4.
185.
Non-Paper from the United States, supra note 178, ¶ 2.5; see Communication from
the United States, Ensuring That Trade Rules Support Innovative Advances in Computer
Applications and Platforms, Such as Mobile Applications and the Provision of Cloud Computing
Services, pt. 111.10, WTO Doc. S/C/W/339 (Sept. 20, 2011).
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purposes."'186 Further, restrictions on data flows also reduce users'
1 87
choice of technology and services on the Internet.
However, certain other WTO Members including Canada,
Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, and the European Union have taken a
more interventionist approach regarding cross-border data flows.
They argue that legal provisions on cross-border data flows and data
localization and local content requirements should be subject to
appropriate public policy exceptions. 188 These proposals, however, do
not specifically outline whether the WTO agreements (particularly the
GATS) are sufficient in dealing with cross-border data flows, or
whether new disciplines would be necessary for the same. On the
other hand, the proposal by Brazil is categorically clear that the
existing GATS structure adequately covers obligations on data flows
and that no new disciplines are necessary. 189 Generally speaking,
these Members remain very cautious in their proposals for balancing
legal commitments on cross-border data flows with other aspects, such
as enforcing domestic privacy and consumer protection laws or
imposing restrictions to protect the security of networks (unlike the
1 90
US proposal, which has a weak exception for data protection).
Unsurprisingly, a recent proposal from China does not discuss data
localization or directly address issues related to cross-border data
flows, such as privacy and cybersecurity. 19 1
2. Building a Sound Regulatory Environment for Electronic Commerce
Another theme that is common to several of the recent WTO
Members' proposals on electronic commerce is building an open,
secure, and reliable regulatory environment for electronic commerce.
The following regulatory issues, termed "consumer confidence

Non-Paperfrom the United States, supra note 178, ¶ 2.4; see Non-Paperfrom Brazil,
186.
4.1, WTO Doc. JOB/GC/98 (July 20, 2016).
Communication from Canada et al., Trade Policy, the WTO, and the Digital
187.
Economy, ¶¶ 1.2, 4.2, WTO Doc. JOB/GC/116, JOB/CTG/4 JOB/SERV/248, JOB/IP/21,
JOB/DEV/42 (Jan. 13, 2017) [hereinafter Trade Policy, the WTO, and the Digital Economy].
Id. T 19; Communication from the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu,
188.
Kinmen & Matsu, Protection of Personal Information and Development of Electronic Commerce,
¶¶ 1.5-1.6, WTO Doc. S/C/W/360 (May 13, 2015) [hereinafter Protection of PersonalInformation
and Development of Electronic Commerce].
See Non-Paperfrom Brazil, supra note 186, T 4.9.
189.
Trade Policy, the WTO, and the Digital Economy, supra note 187, T 4.2;
190.
see Non-Paperfrom the United States, supra note 178, ¶ 2.3.
Aiming at the 11th Ministerial Conference, supra note 47; see also Communication
191.
from the Russian Federation, Draft Ministerial Decision of XX December 2017, WTO Doc.
JOB/GC/137 (Oct. 6, 2017) (identifying various issues of discussion-though not including
cross-border data flows or data localization-under a new Work Programme).
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enhancing measures" by some WTO Members, 192 appear in many of
the recent proposals: privacy, consumer protection, regulation of
spam, electronic authentication and signature services, and
cybersecurity. 193 Many of these proposals have been circulated by
Members that support an interventionist approach in electronic
commerce in order to safeguard public interests, such as Canada,
Chile, South Korea, Singapore, Brazil, Taiwan, and the European
Union. 194 Expectedly, these proposals set out much stricter standards
on consumer protection and privacy compared to the United States
and China. 195
However, unlike the US proposal, the Japanese
proposal strongly endorses the importance of "[t]ransparent and
effective measures," protection of online consumers "from fraudulent
and deceptive commercial practices," and enabling a "secure
environment in online commercial activities." 1 9 6
3. Promoting Developing Country Interests
Proposals from China on electronic commerce are different
from many other proposals discussed above because they are primarily
aimed at highlighting the importance of digital inclusion and
promoting developing country interests in digital trade. 197 While
these proposals champion the cause of developing countries and least
192.
See, e.g., Trade Policy, the WTO, and the Digital Economy, supra note 187, ¶ 4.2;
Non-Paper from Brazil, supra note 186, ¶ 4.3; see also Non-Paper from Japan, supra note 182,
T 4.2A.
193.

See, e.g., Communication from the European Union, An Enabling Environment to

Facilitate Online Transactions, ¶ 1.1, WTO Doc. TN/S/W/64 (lVay 23, 2017) [hereinafter An
EnablingEnvironment to Facilitate Online Transactions];Proposal by Hong Kong, China et al.,
ReinvigoratingDiscussionson Electronic Commerce, ¶ 1.1, WTO Doc. JOB/GC/96/Rev.1 (July 14,
2016) [hereinafter Reinvigorating Discussions on Electronic Commerce]; Protection of Personal
Information and the Development of Electronic Commerce, supra note 188,

¶

3.1; Communication

from Australia, Suggestions on ICT Principles: Contribution to the Work Programme on
Electronic Commerce, T 2, WTO Doc. S/C/W/349 (Sept. 26, 2012).
194.
See generally Trade Policy, the WTO, and the Digital Economy, supra note 187;
Non-Paper from Brazil, supra note 186; Protection of Personal Information and Development of
ElectronicCommerce, supra note 188.
195.
Compare Non-Paperfrom the United States, supra note 178, and Aiming at the 11th
Ministerial Conference, supra note 47, with Trade Policy, the WTO, and the Digital Economy,
supra note 187, and Non-Paper from Brazil, supra note 186. While the United States may be
largely doing so to promote market-driven regulation in electronic commerce, China's stance
could be attributed to its general lack of transparency in these policy areas, particularly to
dissuade foreign players from entering the market.
196.
Non-Paper from Japan, supra note 182, T 4.2A; see also An EnablingEnvironment to
FacilitateOnline Transactions,supra note 193, T 2.1.
197.
See, e.g., Communication from China, E-Commerce Elements for MC11, TT 6.1, 6.2,
WTO Doc. JOB/GC/142, JOB/CTG/9, JOB/SERV/271, JOB/DEV/49 (Oct. 19, 2017); Aiming at the
11th MinisterialConference, supra note 47, ¶¶ 3.2, 5.2.
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developed countries (LDCs) on issues such as trade facilitation,
logistics, and online payments-particularly in order to facilitate
participation of MSMEs in digital trade-they do not otherwise
expand on facilitating an open and transparent regulatory
environment for electronic commerce. 198 Being the leader of electronic
commerce in the Asia-Pacific region, China's proposal before the WTO
In addition to China, other developing country
is significant.
Members have supported the development dimension of electronic
commerce. This is particularly the case in the following areas: the role
of trade facilitation in enabling electronic commerce, trade assistance
to developing countries to focus on infrastructure gaps in electronic
commerce, enabling greater access to online payments, and building
cooperation between countries to enhance trust and fighting
cybercrimes. 199 The above proposals pertaining to trade facilitation
and trade finance to support SMEs in developing countries have
drawn significant interest among developing country Members in the
WT0 200 as well as the wider policy community. 201
4. Enhancing Innovation in Technical StandardS 202
In order to safeguard the interests of private companies,
certain digital leaders, such as the United States and Japan, have also
included proposals to enhance private sector innovation in technical
standards (e.g., standards related to privacy and security) and
safeguard digital assets of companies, such as source code and other
trade secrets. For example, the United States has proposed that
forced transfers of technology, production processes, or "other
proprietary information" should be prohibited by trade rules. 203
Further, the United States has proposed that trade rules should
prevent a government from requiring foreign companies to hand over
source code or proprietary algorithms to regulators or adopt prescribed
See, e.g., Aiming at the 11th MinisterialConference, supra note 47.
198.
Non-Paperfrom Colombia et al., Electronic Commerce and Development, ¶ 1.4, WTO
199.
Doc. JOB/GC/101/Rev.1 (July 28, 2016); see also Communication from Bangladesh, Draft
Ministerial Decision on Electronic Commerce, at 1, WTO Doc. JOB/GC/152/Rev.1 (Nov. 20, 2017);
Trade Policy, the WTO, and the DigitalEconomy, supra note 187, ¶¶ 1.1, 4.2.
See MARC AUBOIN ET AL., WORLD TRADE ORG.,
200.
LEVELLING THE TRADING FIELD FOR SMES 4 (2016).

WORLD TRADE REPORT

2016:

Item 6-Work Programme on Electronic
Chairman,
WTO
e.g.,
See,
201.
Commerce-Review of Progress, ¶ 1.3, WTO Doc. WT/GC/W/728 (Dec. 8, 2016). See generally
INT'L TRADE CTR. ET AL., MAKING THE WTO TRADE FACILITATION AGREEMENT WORK FOR SMEs
(2016); WTO SECRETARIAT, TRADE FINANCE AND SMES: BRIDGING THE GAPS IN PROVISION (2016).

Brazil circulated a separate proposal on the importance of copyright issues in
202.
electronic commerce in 2017. See Electronic Commerce and Copyright, supra note 20.
Non-Paperfrom the United States, supra note 178, ¶ 2.6.
203.
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technical standardS 204 to access new markets-unless necessary to
"obtain access . . . in order to protect health, safety, or other legitimate
regulatory goals." 2 0 5 Finally, the United States has proposed that

trade rules should promote innovation in encryption products. 2 06
Japan's proposals are very similarly worded and show strong
commitment to protecting digital assets of businesses, including
protecting trade secrets from cyberattacks. 207
Although these
proposals highlight the importance of market-driven standards in
promoting better quality of digital products, they also touch upon
issues related to Internet governance; 208 however, none has
highlighted specific mechanisms for implementation and coordination
with relevant Internet governance bodies.
5. Institutional Improvements
Some of the recent proposals by WTO Members on electronic
commerce also deliberate on potential avenues for institutional
improvements, both at the domestic and global level. For example,
the United States recognizes the importance of "strong commitments
on transparency, stakeholder participation, coordination, and impact
assessment for new regulatory measures, standards, and conformity
assessment procedures" in electronic commerce.209 The European
Union, Canada, and a host of other WTO Members recognize the
significance of enhanced dialogue between countries under the aegis of
the WTO to exchange information on "good practices." 210 Other
improvements recommended by these Members are the inclusion of
electronic commerce as an issue in the Trade Policy Review
Mechanism 211 and the exchange of information through WTO
committees. 2 12
Many of the above proposals also acknowledge the significance
of the work on digital trade carried out by other international
204.
Id. ¶f 2.8, 2.11.
205.
Id. ¶ 2.7.
206.
Id. 2.11.
207.
Non-Paper from Japan, supra note 182, TT 4.2C, 4.2D.
208.
See id. ¶¶ 4.2D, 4.2G.
209.
Non-Paper from the United States, supra note 178, TT 2.15, 2.16.
210.
Trade Policy, the WTO, and the Digital Economy, supra note 187, ¶ 4.2C(24).
211.
Id. ¶ 4.2D(25). The Trade Policy Review Mechanism is a periodic assessment of the
level of compliance attained by WTO Members with rules and commitments made under various
WTO agreements. See Julien Chaisse & Debashis Chakraborty, Implementing WTO Rules
Through Negotiations and Sanctions: The Role of Trade Policy Review Mechanism and Dispute
Settlement System, 28 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 153, 160-61 (2007).
212.
Possible Way Forward on Electronic Commerce, supra note 53, Annex; Trade Policy,
the WTO, and the Digital Economy, supra note 187, ¶ 4.2D(27).
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institutions. For example, Japan highlights the significance of APEC
initiatives on digital trade and how such initiatives can guide the
development of multilateral disciplines on electronic commerce at the
Similarly, a handful of WTO Members highlight the
WTO. 2 1 3
recommendations from UNCTAD as being pertinent to enabling better
regulation of electronic commerce in developing countries. 214 Further,
high-level principles on data transfer and privacy have been developed
by the OECD. 2 1 5 Unlike many other proposals, however, a recent
Russian proposal suggests that the WTO should "remain the only
universal platform for the development of multilateral rules and in
particular multilateral rules for the e-commerce regulation,"
of multistakeholder
suspicion
inherent
Russia's
indicating
216
As discussed below in Part IV.C.3, several linkages to
institutions.
the WTO will be critical in addressing the cross-cutting nature of
policy challenges in the digital economy, including linkages between
the WTO and, for example, the Internet Corporation for Assigned
Names and Numbers (ICANN) on Internet domain names; the United
Nations Commissions on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) on
electronic signatures and electronic contracts; the International
Telecommunications Union (ITU) on cybersecurity standards; the
Internet Governance Forum (IGF) and Internet Society (ISOC) on
Internet policy issues; and UNCTAD on electronic commerce and
development issues.
In the Authors' view, the recent proposals by different WTO
Members on electronic commerce reflect important needs of the
current
digital
economy,
especially
the
cross-cutting,
multidimensional nature of electronic commerce. 2 17 These proposals
aim not only to address existing barriers in digital trade (e.g., data
localization measures and lack of permanent moratorium on customs
duties on electronic transmissions) but also to help facilitate the
growth of a healthier policy environment for electronic commerce by
looking at broader issues such as privacy, consumer protection, spam
regulation, Internet openness, and cybersecurity. The development
dimension of electronic commerce (e.g., providing support to SMEs
and assisting developing countries in building a regulatory framework

213.
See Non-Paperfrom Japan, supra note 182, ¶ 5.1.
See, e.g., ReinvigoratingDiscussionson Electronic Commerce, supranote 193, T 4.1.
214.
OECD Privacy Guidelines (2013), supra note 139.
215.
Ways to Move Forward,supra note 177, ¶ 1.5.
216.
217.
See, e.g., Communication from Australia, Canada, Colombia, Qatar and Singapore,
Advancing Work on the E-Commerce Work Programme, WTO Doc. JOB/GC/132, T 1.3 (July 14,
2017) [hereinafter Advancing Work on the E-Commerce Work Programme].
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for digital trade) 2 18 will also be an important complement to the Work
Programme in terms of both economic development and digital
inclusion. Considering several of these proposals below, the Authors
identify areas and avenues for reform in international trade law to
facilitate digital trade.
B. Areas for Reform in InternationalTrade Law
The WTO Members identified four clear objectives of electronic
commerce regulation at the start of the Work Programme that remain
relevant even today: "creat[ing] conditions in which [digital]
technology will flourish," achieving a fine balance between legitimate
public policy objectives and technical innovation, finding global
solutions for some of the prevailing policy challenges, and protecting
the special needs of developing countries. 219 In order to implement
these objectives, this Section suggests three broad areas of reform in
the multilateral trade framework: improving market access for digital
trade, addressing regulatory barriers to digital trade, and integrating
developing countries into the digital trade system.
1. Improving Market Access for Digital Trade
The discord between Member states on the definition of digital
products, classification of digital services, and the political sensitivity
of the audiovisual sector and, more recently, the cloud computing
sector, has prevented any meaningful liberalization in digital trade for
most of the last two decades. 220 Further, the failure to improve
commitments in Mode 4 supply has also slowed down the growth of
the digital sector. 221 With the exception of the Information Technology
Agreement, no other initiative at the WTO has successfully enhanced
prospects for deepening liberalization in digital trade. 22 2 Thus, the

218.
See generally WTO SECRETARIAT, E-COMMERCE IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES:
OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES FOR SMALL AND MEDIUM-SIZED ENTERPRISES (2013),

https://www.wto.org/english/res-elbooksp-e/ecombrochuree.pdf
219.

[https://perma.cc/K8UE-P82L].

See MARC BACCHETTA ET AL., WORLD TRADE ORG., ELECTRONIC COMMERCE AND THE

ROLE OF THE WTO 1 (1998), https://www.econstor.eulbitstream/10419/107052/1/wto-specialstudy_2_e.pdf [https://perma.cc/DS3U-C743].
220.
See discussion supra Part III.A.1.
221.
See Pat Saini, Digital Tech-Meeting the Sector's Burgeoning Immigration Needs,
LEXOLOGY (June 16, 2017), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=8b52004c-59ff-406cbe42-520b09c83551 [https://perma.cc/JHZ6-6U7Z].
222.
For a discussion on the liberalization achieved by the Information Technology
Agreement, see Michael Anderson & Jacob Mohs, The Information Technology Agreement: An
Assessment of World Trade in Information Technology Products, 2011 J. INT'L COM. & ECON. 109,
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existing multilateral framework has failed to sufficiently incentivize
WTO Members to improve market access in digital trade or to reduce
discriminatory barriers to digital trade. However, access to larger
markets is essential to increasing profitability of digital trade as it
lowers marginal costs and increases economies of scale. 2 2 3
The structure of the GATS provides considerable autonomy to
Members to undertake commitments in digital services sectors in
relation to market access and national treatment. Most developing
countries are hesitant to expand their commitments, particularly in
the digital service industry, due to a variety of motives including lack
of regulatory capacity and covert protectionism of the domestic digital
While developed country Members have shown greater
sector.
support for a formulaic approach in inscribing commitments in
24
Most
schedules or inscribing commitments at the two-digit level, 2

developing country Members prefer a less liberalizing, disaggregated
approach or, alternatively, argue that most new types of digital trade
fall outside the service sectors classified under the W/120. 2 25 Lee
Tuthill and Shin-yi Peng argue that the principle of technological
neutrality may be instructive in interpreting existing commitments of
Members more broadly. 226 Even if the existing commitments of
Members are read in a technologically neutral manner to include
evolving business models in the digital sector, significant uncertainty
continues to exist because these commitments are dated and often do
not include subsectors where liberalization is essential for the growth
of electronic commerce.
Issues related to the classification of digital services and
expansion of Members' commitments in the digital sector are complex
Therefore, other types of reforms in
and often intractable.
international trade law are necessary to create a more consistent,
https://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/journals/05_andersonmohs-itagreement.pdf
149,
[https://perma.cc/C345-PPP6].
See CORY, supra note 45, at 3.
223.
See, e.g., Gen. Agreement on Trade in Serv.: Examination of S. Am. Trading
224.
Partners' Schedules of Commitments, Inv. No. 332-367, USITC Pub. 3007, at 11-1 n.2 (Dec.
1996). A two-digit level inscription refers to a general "sector"-such as business services or
communication services-and a specific "subsector" then typically refers to a higher digit level
(e.g., three-digit, four-digit, or five-digit level). See generally Services Sectoral ClassificationList,
supra note 70.
See S. Ctr., Classificationin Services: An Overview of the Main Issues for Developing
225.
2005),
(Jan.
SC/TADP/AN/SV/11
Doc.
Ctr.
S.
16-20,
¶f
Countries,
https://www.southeentre.int/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/ANSV1 1_Classification-inServicesEN.pdf [https://perma.cc/4SZF-GDLL]; see also Aaditya Mattoo & Sacha WunschVincent, Pre-empting Protectionism in Services: The GATS and Outsourcing, 7 J. INT'L ECON. L.
765, 781, 798 (2004).
See Tuthill, supra note 18, at 379; Peng, supranote 78, at 427-28.
226.
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secure, and predictable legal and policy framework for digital trade.
In the long run, a better regulatory environment will also encourage
more Members to enhance their commitments in service sectors
related to electronic commerce (e.g., computer and related services and
telecommunication services). This is particularly true for developing
countries wary of making deep commitments in service sectors
because of a lack of sufficient domestic regulatory capacity and a deepseated suspicion of foreign commercial interests.
2. Addressing Regulatory Barriers to Digital Trade
The regulatory framework (both - at the domestic and
international levels) for digital trade should be secure, stable,
transparent, interoperable, and predictable. 227 As discussed in Part
IV.B.1 above, many Members have already identified important policy
areas where WTO rules are necessary in order to facilitate digital
trade.
Many PTAs also recognize the importance of regulatory
frameworks in electronic commerce that support "industry-led
development." 2 2 8
In circumstances where regulatory frameworks
across countries are in conflict with each other, companies engaging in
digital trade face disproportionate costs in customizing their business
models and thereby face barriers to trade. 229 For example, the
adoption of divergent regulatory approaches to data protection often
increases compliance costs for companies operating across different
markets. 230
Further, certain governments adopt unclear and
ambiguous regulations to control the Internet within their borders for
various reasons, including protecting public moralS 231 and security. 232
227.
See GLOB. COMM'N ON INTERNET GOVERNANCE, ONE INTERNET vi, 19 (2016); TASK
FORCE ON ADVANCING A TRANSATLANTIC DIG. AGENDA, ATL. COUNCIL, BUILDING A
TRANSATLANTIC DIGITAL MARKETPLACE: TWENTY STEPS TOWARD 2020, at 15 (2016).

228.
229.

See, e.g., CHAFTA, supra note 133, art. 12.5.
See Alan 0. Skyes, The (Limited) Role of Regulatory Harmonization in International

Goods and Services Markets, 2 J. INT'L ECON. L. 49, 49-50 (1999).

230.
231.

See Burri, supra note 2, at 334-35.
See, e.g., Jisuanji Xinxi Wangluo Guoji Lianwang Anquan Baohu Guanli Banfa (itu
l)
[Measures for Security Protection Administration of the
International Networking of Computer Information Networks] (promulgated by the Ministry of
Pub.
Sec., Dec.
11,
1997,
effective Dec.
30,
1997) WIPO,
art.
4 (China),
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/details.jsp?id=6571 [https://perma.ccIW8CU-33RD]; Broadcasting
(Class License) Notification (Cap 28, N 1, 2004 Rev Ed), Schedule, §§ 13, 15 (Sing.)
https://sso.agc.gov.sg/SL/BA1994-N1?DocDate=20161227 [https://perma.cc/8UXJ-AAV2].
232.
See, e.g., Undang-Undang Tentang Pelayanan Publik [Public Service Law Number
25/2009],
No. 25/2009,
art.
21 (July 18,
2009) (Indon.),
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/
natlex/natlex4.detail?pang=en&p-isn=84185
[https://perma.cc/YF77-N982];
0
Vnesenii
Izmeneniy v Otdel'nyye Zakonodatel'nyye Akty Rossiyskoy Federatsii v Chasti Utochneniya
Poryadka Obrabotki Personal'nykh Dannykh v Informatsionno-Telekommunikatsionnykh
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Many companies (particularly MSMEs) find it cumbersome or
unprofitable to navigate these complex regulations and might be
effectively deterred from operating in these countries. 233 Experts have
argued that the issue of cross-border data flows should ideally be
covered by horizontal commitments rather than on a sector-by-sector
basis in order to enable the digital economy as a whole. 2 3 4 Further,
companies across all sectors of the economy find it difficult to conduct
digital trade in markets with a poor domestic regulatory framework in
critical areas such as data protection, cybersecurity, and online
consumer protection. 235
A question therefore arises surrounding the role that
international trade agreements can play in improving the regulatory
framework for digital trade and the extent to which these issues
should be addressed by WTO agreements. This Article argues that
WTO law needs to directly or indirectly address the above regulatory
barriers to improve the regulatory framework for digital trade. Not
only the substance but also the process through which rules on
electronic commerce are negotiated will be critical in the development
236
of sound and well-balanced disciplines on electronic commerce.
Developing countries are likely to favor the use of the WTO, as
compared to PTAs, to engage in deeper discussions on regulatory
reforms. For example, in 2013, Taiwan had recommended the use of
the WTO platform to discuss "experiences and best practices in
international cooperation on the cross-border transfer and protection
of personal information." 2 37 Some key regulatory issues that are likely
to arise in the context of the regulation of digital trade by
international trade law (particularly in relation to cross-border data
Setyakhn [On Amending Some Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation In as Much as It
Concerns Updating the Procedure for Personal Data Processing in InformationTelecommunication Networks], SOBRANIE ZAKONODATEL'sTVA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [SZ RF]

[Russian Federation Collection of Legislation] 2014, No. 242-FZ, Item 15.5 (Russ.); Nghe Dinh
Quan Ly, Cung Cap, Su Dung Dich Vu Internet Va Thong Tin Tren Mang [On the Management,
Provision and Use of Internet Services and Online Information], No. 72/2013/ND-CP, arts. 4.4, 5
(July 15, 2013) (Viet.), https://vnnic.vn/en/about/legaldocs/decree-no-72-2013-nd-cp-july-15-2013management-provision-and-use-internet?lang=en [https://perma.cclXGP5-BC88].
See Cross-BorderData Flows: Could Foreign ProtectionismHurt U.S. Jobs?: Hearing
233.
Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Mfg. & Trade of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce,
113th Cong. 8 (2014) (statement of Linda Dempsey, Vice President, International Economic
Affairs, National Association of Manufacturers).
See, e.g., INT'L DIG. ECON. ALL., supra note 98, at 8.
234.
See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., supra note 3, at 63; Skyes, supra note
235.
229, at 51, 59.
See Thomas Cottier, The Impact of New Technologies on Multilateral Trade
236.
Regulation and Governance, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 415, 431 (1996).
See Protection of Personal Information and Development of Electronic Commerce,
237.
supra note 188, ¶ 1.2.
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flows) include protection of consumer interests in the online context;
developing interoperable standards for electronic signatures,
paperless trading, and cloud computing; preventing measures on data
localization without compromising on other goals such as privacy and
cybersecurity; protecting vital digital assets of technology companies
while protecting individual users; and generally promoting a free and
open Internet, which provides choice of technology to internet users
worldwide. 238
In order to enable free digital trade flows and increase global
economic welfare, the GATS or any other multilateral framework
under the WTO needs to simultaneously consider issues of Internet
security, protect Internet user interests, and promote a free and open
Internet that boosts digital innovation. Being a trade institution, the
WTO is ill-equipped to engage in several aspects of digital trade, such
as setting standards on cybersecurity or data protection, or
determining legitimacy of online censorship (e.g., blocking of
websites). However, WTO rules can support the creation of a more
suitable regulatory environment at the international level by (a)
providing horizontal disciplines on cross-border flows of data, (b)
acknowledging the importance of regulatory preconditions necessary
for cross-border flows of data (e.g., privacy and security), and (c)
encouraging countries to take adequate policy action to promote and
protect these policy goals. In that regard, the recent proposals before
the Work Programme (as discussed in Part IV.A above) can be a good
starting point for discussion among the larger WTO membership.
The next question is the nature and extent of regulatory
coordination necessary to create an enabling framework for digital
trade. Scholars propose a shift in approach from "reciprocal market
opening" to "creating the regulatory preconditions for liberalization" of
trade in services. 239
Some scholars have taken the view that
regulatory harmonization across countries is typically unnecessary to
achieve "maximization of global economic welfare" and can restrict
"socially productive" regulatory choices by countries. 240 For example,

238.
THEIR

KONSTANTINOS
ROLE

IN

THE

KARACHALIOS & KAREN MCCABE, STANDARDS, INNOVATION, AND
OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION
2-4 (2013),

CONTEXT

http://el5initiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/E15-Innovation-KarachaliosMeCabeFINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZM64-3NS7]; JOSHUA P. MELTZER, MAXIMIZING THE OPPORTUNITIES
OF
THE
INTERNET
FOR
INTERNATIONAL
TRADE
6-7
(2016),

http://www3.weforum.org/does/E15/WEFDigitalTrade-report_2015_1401.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5VBX-93Q6].
239.

AADITYA

MATOO,

SERVICES TRADE AND

REGULATORY

COOPERATION

http://el5initiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/E15-Services-Mattoo-FINAL.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2H3E-F4AS].
240.
Skyes, supra note 229, at 51; see also MATOO, supra note 239, at 6-7, 11.
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(2015),
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specific requirements related to transparency and nondiscrimination,
along with mutual recognition agreements, are likely to be more
effective in reducing trade barriers than regulatory harmonization. 24 1
Specific to digital trade, Joshua Meltzer argues that there is a "need
for cooperation to address the regulatory externalities that can arise
from digital trade and the incentives this can create for governments
to restrict cross-border data flows," referring to the example of APEC
Cross-Border Privacy Principles. 242 Others present a stronger case for
regulatory harmonization through international trade law to create an
enabling framework for digital trade. For example, Anupam Chander
offers a model of regulatory harmonization combined with giving
243
preference to local policy (e.g., in relation to online censorship).
However, it is unclear how both of these processes can work
harmoniously in a world with highly differentiated values on Internet
regulation and huge power differentials.
A deep form of regulatory convergence (such as regulatory
harmonization) is neither practical nor desirable in the context of the
WTO and electronic commerce. While addressing issues in digital
trade will necessarily require the WTO to look beyond what already
exists under the GATS, the WTO does not have the expertise or
mandate to set down standards on issues related to technical and
sociocultural aspects of Internet regulation. 244 Further, given the
diverse membership of the WTO, it is unlikely that most Members will
agree to uniform rules on issues like privacy and cybersecurity.
Rather, as Mira Burri suggests, an agreement on high-level principles
on the governing framework for digital trade will provide a strong
foundation for future negotiations on electronic commerce at the

See Skyes, supra note 229, at 50, 52; see also Fernanda G. Nicola, The Politicization
241.
of Legal Expertise in the TTIP Negotiation, 78 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 175, 182-83 (2015).
242.

MELTZER, supra note 238, at 7.

243.

See Anupam Chander, Principles for Trade 2.0, in TRADE GOVERNANCE IN THE

DIGITAL AGE, supra note 18, at 17, 26-28, 33; see also Skyes, supra note 229, at 51 (submitting
that "regulatory harmonization might seem the most straightforward solution to the trade
impediments created by regulatory heterogeneity").
244.

See, e.g., KARACHALIOS & MCCABE, supra note 238, at 3 ("The standardization

paradigm that enabled the success of the Internet provides for the involvement of participants
from all around the world, outside of the limitations of nation-centric processes."); see also
Gregory Shaffer & Henry Gao, China's Rise: How It Took on the U.S. at the WTO, 2018 U. ILL. L.
REV. 115, 179-80 (discussing the impotence of existing WTO rules to address China's
requirement for foreign companies "to use local servers and hand over the[irl source code" before
providing Internet services (footnotes omitted)). Although it falls outside the scope of this Article,
another related area of research is to investigate the appropriate multistakeholder and
multilateral platforms in setting such technical standards. See Burri, supra note 2, at 339-40. In
Part IV.C.3 below, the Authors discuss the importance of multistakeholder approaches in
addressing several aspects of digital trade at the WTO.
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WTO. 2 4 5

The evolution of such principles will necessitate creative
partnerships between the WTO and other international and
multistakeholder institutions, including the private sector.
Further, if the WTO agreements promoted specific standards
and regulations in relation to electronic commerce, they might
disproportionately advantage developed countries and a few other
developing countries such as China. 246 As a result, other developing
countries and LDCs might not be able to reap the full benefits of the
digital economy and might be forced to open up their domestic
markets without being adequately prepared.
Instead, the WTO
should be a platform for countries to identify important areas for
regulatory cooperation in electronic commerce and to find creative
solutions to liberalize digital trade without prejudicing domestic
regulatory interests. Therefore, rather than setting standards, the
WTO should focus on building consensus around high-level principles
that recognize the importance of maintaining an open and free
environment for digital trade flows, while simultaneously addressing
consumer concerns related to trust and security of digital products. 247
Such rules can bring greater certainty in the legal environment for
digital trade in two ways: (a) creating a more integrated global
marketplace driven by a relatively less fragmented Internet, and (b)
dissuading countries from adopting provisions that disproportionately
favor Internet openness over security and privacy issues or vice versa,
thus preventing digital protectionism.
3. Integration of Developing Countries
The integration of developing countries into the digital
economy is one of the biggest attractions in the development discourse
today. The recent proposals by China and the Friends of E-Commerce
for Development are timely and significant, and they constitute an
essential element of the Work Programme. As the largest and most
diverse trade institution in the world, the membership of the WTO is
well suited to understand and support developing country concerns
compared to most PTAs, which are often power driven. GATS Article
IV sets out various mechanisms by which developed countries can

245.
Burri, supra note 2, at 349.
246.
See id. at 335.
247.
See id. at 349. For example, the APEC has set up a Cross-Border Privacy
Enforcement Agreement that helps regulatory authorities in different Member countries to share
information and to find mechanisms for cross-border cooperation among regulators regarding
domestic privacy enforcement. See CPEA, supra note 139, T 2.1. Such platforms could be helpful
in the WTO as well, to achieve consensus on principles pertinent to cross-border digital trade.
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facilitate participation of developing countries and LDCs in all service
sectors.
In order to promote the goals set out in GATS Article IV and
achieve the overall objective of progressive liberalization in digital
trade, measures supporting developing countries to integrate better
into the digital economy are crucial, in addition to other reforms
Some measures that the WTO can undertake
outlined above. 248
include (a) supporting various initiatives to integrate MSMEs in
developing countries, such as by providing technical assistance, trade
finance initiatives, 249 or simplification of customs procedures (in the
long run, WTO Members could adopt dedicated disciplines on
250
(b)
facilitating SMEs, particularly in the context of online trade);
facilitating electronic payment services in developing countries and
LDCs; and (c) initiating more dialogue in the Committee for Trade and
Additionally, further
Development to enable information sharing.
of technical
provision
avenues could be explored to facilitate
25
assistance and training to developing countries. 1 These reforms and

248.
See Communication from Costa Rica, Draft Ministerial Decision: WTO E-Commerce
Development Agenda, at 2, WTO Doc. JOB/GC/139 (Oct. 10, 2017); Debating the Future of
E-Commerce and Digital Trade in Buenos Aires, INT'L CTR. FOR TRADE & SUSTAINABLE DEV.

https://www.ictsd.org/bridges-news/bridges/news/debating-the-future-of-e2017),
30,
(Nov.
commerce-and-digital-trade-in-buenos-aires [https://perma.ccNH6U-FHQW]; see also Advancing
Work on the E-Commerce Work Programme, supra note 217, 1 1.3.
Brian Flood, Trade Policy: WTO, Chamber Launch Initiative to Help Small
249.
2017),
17,
(Aug.
REP.
WTO
BNA:
BLOOMBERG
Trade,
Businesses
http://news.bna.com/wtln/display/batchprint-display.adp?searchid=31151015
[https:/perma.cc/NMZ8-J6FS]; see, e.g., Trade Finance Program, AFR. DEV. BANK GROUP,
https://www.afdb.org/en/topics-and-sectors/initiatives-partnerships/trade-finance-program/
[https://perma.cc/J4D8-PHLS] (last visited Mar. 31, 2018).
See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., FACILITATING SMES ACCESS TO
250.
http://www.oecd.org/cfe/smes/31919223.pdf
(2004),
5
MARKETS
INTERNATIONAL

[https://perma.cc/9AMV-Q5NP]. Experts argue that promoting initiatives such as trade finance
and electronic payments is only possible when strong regulatory frameworks on digital trade are
already in existence, including measures such as online trade facilitation. See Finbarr
Bermingham, Trade Digitisation "Must Come Before Blockchain", GLOBAL TRADE REV. (Sept. 6,
https://www.gtreview.com/news/asia/trade-digitisation-must-come-before-blockchain/
2017),
[https://perma.cclVX3F-GKBQ]; discussion supra Part IV.B.2; see also TPP Agreement, supra
note 35, ch. 24.
251.

See INT'L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, WTO BUSINESS FOCUs GROUP 1: MSMES AND

E-COMMERCE 2 (2016), https://cdn.iccwbo.org/content/uploads/sites/3/2016/1O/WTO-Businessfocus-Group-1-MSMEs-and-e-commerce.pdf [https://perma.cc/688D-QF9E]. In this context, the
WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement provides a useful reference point for special and
differentiated treatment, as it allows developing country Members to categorize their
commitments in various categories. See Agreement on Trade Facilitation art. 14, Feb. 22, 2017
[hereinafter Agreement on Trade Facilitation], https://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/tfanov14 e.htm#fntext-23 [https://perma.cc/X2TW-WEQU]; see also Gen. Council, Protocol
Amending the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, WTO Doc.
WT/L/940 (Nov. 28, 2014). Category A lists commitments which would be binding when the
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policy initiatives will not only generate political goodwill but will also
enhance the capacity and expertise of developing countries and LDCs
to undertake other reforms, such as expanding commitments on
digital trade liberalization and creating a domestic regulatory
environment compatible with global standards on issues like privacy
and cybersecurity.
C. Exploring Different Avenues for Reforming InternationalTrade Law
Despite the lack of any substantial progress in multilateral
trade negotiations on electronic commerce for almost two decades at
the WTO and the emergence of PTAs as the frontier of digital trade
governance, several avenues are still available within the WTO to
implement reforms and to make meaningful changes in the
international trade regime. Compared to PTAs, the WTO framework
is likely to be more stable, be more resilient, and better represent the
diverging interests of countries. As discussed above in Part III.B.3,
PTAs containing Electronic Commerce Chapters are likely only
stepping stones to a global digital trade framework under the WTO.
In the long run, sole reliance on PTAs will result in fragmentation and
incoherence in the digital trade regime.

1. Working Within the GATS
The first avenue is to explore different options under the
existing GATS structure to improve commitments of WTO Members
under their schedule of commitments. For example, the WTO could
adopt a cluster approach to the classification of digital products or
attempt to arrive at a consensus among Members regarding the scope
of services covered under the different sectors of the W/120. Per Lee
Tuthill, instead of developing new disciplines, the existing GATS
structure can simply be used to encourage Members to improve and
expand their commitments in the various technology-related sectors,
particularly value-added telecommunication services. 2 52 Further, to a
certain extent, the transparency obligations under GATS Article III
agreement comes into force, Category B lists commitments which can be implemented over a
period of time, and Category C lists commitments where developing countries seek assistance
from developed countries to implement their commitments on a future date (however, there is no
legal obligation on developed countries to provide such assistance). See Agreement on Trade
Facilitation, supra, art. 14. The Category C commitments are particularly unique as they help
identify areas in which developing countries need assistance. See id. art. 16; see also Request by
Delegation of Singapore, ASEAN Reflections on Lunch Panel on "Can E-Commerce Trade Rules
Help MSMEs from Developing Countries?" Held During the UNCTAD E-Commerce Week, 27
April 2017, WTO Doc. JOB/GC/126 (June 2, 2017); INT'L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra, at 3.
252.
See Tuthill, supra note 18, at 378-79.
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may also enable WTO Members to understand the nature of
regulations imposed by countries and their impact on digital trade.
However, new disciplines may be necessary within the WTO
because the GATS was implemented well before the Internet age and
does not adequately address all needs of the digital economy. In the
words of Thomas Cottier, in the case of new communication
technologies, the task is not that of "liberalizing old and rusty
structures" but of "framing global public policies." 253 Certain existing
rules under the GATS can help in adopting some of this Article's
suggested regulatory reforms. For example, WTO Members could
adopt new disciplines on domestic regulation necessary to promote
cross-border data flows under GATS Article VI:4, 2 54 or they could
undertake additional commitments-such as a Reference Paper on
Digital Trade under GATS Article XVIII-which could be signed up by
WTO Members. 255 Another option could be appending an Annex on
Electronic Commerce to the GATS, setting out disciplines on electronic
These additional
commerce that are binding on all Members.
disciplines may also provide greater clarity regarding the extent to
which the exceptions available under GATS Articles XIV and XIVbis
may be used by Members to preserve their regulatory autonomy in
regulation of the Internet.
2. A New Agreement Under the WTO
A new agreement under the WTO might be structured more
appropriately to address the existing limitations of the GATS, such as
by adopting a clear, technologically neutral definition of digital
products and making the moratorium on customs duties on electronic
transmissions permanent. 256 Further, a new agreement could be
cross-cutting in nature, recognizing all aspects of digital trade instead
of dividing the various disciplines as the existing WTO architecture
does. Mira Burri recommends the formation of a Digital Economy
Trade Agreement, although she recognizes the high level of political
Hosuk Lee-Makiyama also
infeasibility of this solution. 257

Cottier, supra note 236, at 427.
253.
For examples of disciplines on licensing of digital services and technical
254.
requirements for supply of specific types of digital services-including electronic signatures,
authentication methods, and security and privacy compliance requirements-see Peng, supra
note 69, at 1218.
See Burri, supra note 2, at 349.
255.
See id. at 355. However, a complex question that arises with regard to this option is
256.
the relationship between the commitments made under the GATS and those made under a new
electronic commerce agreement.
Id. at 355.
257.
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acknowledges the importance of a multilateral system, but instead of
sticking to the archaic system of the GATS, he suggests that a new
horizontal discipline should be developed for all trade-related aspects
of data transfer (irrespective of whether it relates to trade in goods or
services), drawing parallels with the TRIPS Agreement and its role in
intellectual property regulation. 258
The Electronic Commerce
Chapters in PTAs are likely to serve as models for the development of
such a new trade agreement under the WTO.
Although the above approach is politically and legally more
challenging, it is likely to be more valuable in the long run because
horizontal disciplines on electronic commerce can better address the
cross-cutting nature of the digital economy. Given the limitations of
the GATS structure (e.g., certain legal obligations are subject to
individual country commitments), a new agreement that applies
horizontally to digital aspects of trade in both goods and services will
provide a more efficient and comprehensive solution.
Further,
inclusion of new provisions in the regulatory framework for digital
trade (as discussed above) may be simpler in the case of a completely
new agreement under the WTO. A new agreement on electronic
commerce may very well take the form of a plurilateral agreement
under Article 11.3 of the WTO Agreement. 259 Even in such a case, the
agreement should necessarily address a broad range of regulatory and
development concerns in digital trade to incentivize the participation
of developing countries and LDCs. The failure to do so will render
meaningless any efforts to facilitate a global regulatory framework for
electronic commerce and to promote integration of countries into the
global digital economy. Another short-term solution is to initiate
modest reforms within the GATS and, in the long run, to aim to
incorporate a more comprehensive digital trade agreement under the
WTO. However, under this approach, a high degree of political inertia
might result due to the unusually long and complicated nature of
multilateral trade negotiations.
In adopting this route for reform, the WTO Members need to
closely consider the relationship between a new WTO agreement on
electronic commerce and the GATS. 260 First, in the case of WTO
disputes pertaining to electronic commerce, should the lex specialis
provisions of the new agreement be given precedence over the

258.
Lee-Makiyama, supra note 18, at 165.
259.
See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization art. 11.3, Apr.
15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154.
260.
See discussion supra Part I.B.2.
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GATS? 261 Second, the scope of liberalization commitments made by a
country in a specific sector can be unclear if its interpretation requires
a consistent reading of the wording of the commitment made under
the GATS with commitments under the new WTO electronic
commerce agreement. The GATS is based on a dated version of the
Central Product Classification (CPC), which does not often cover many
new types of digital services, while the new electronic commerce
agreement would most likely rely on an updated classification
system. 262 Third, another difficult question would be the extent to
which the obligations and exceptions under the GATS could be
interpreted by taking into consideration the dedicated WTO
agreement on electronic commerce or vice versa (depending on how
For example, would regulatory
the new agreement is framed).
requirements pertaining to data protection, online consumer
protection, or cybersecurity contained in the new agreement inform
the interpretation of exceptions under GATS Article XIV or XIVbis, or
the legal obligations under GATS Article VI or III? Although it is
outside the scope of this Article to discuss these issues in detail, these
few examples indicate the potential legal uncertainties and
complications if WTO Members adopted a new agreement containing
disciplines related to digital trade.
3. Building Relationships with Relevant Institutions
Irrespective of whether WTO Members choose to implement a
new agreement or work within the existing GATS framework,
increased dialogue and coordination among governments, industry,
international organizations, and civil society (both at a domestic level
and at a transnational level) is a prerequisite for the development of a
coherent regulatory framework for digital trade. 263 Although many of

Potentially, even the GATT could be relevant in the case of trade in goods via
261.
electronic commerce portals. See Burri, supra note 2, at 341. To understand what happens when
only some parties have signed to this agreement under a plurilateral framework, see discussion
supra Part III.B.3.
See Burri, supra note 2, at 341. Further, if the new agreement adopts a negative
262.
listing approach, the chances of inconsistency with the GATS, which relies on a positive listing
approach, might increase. See Tomer Broude, Selective Subsidiarity and Dialectic Deference in
the World Trade Organization, 79 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 53, 65 (2016). However, depending
on how WTO Members frame their commitments, this might not always be the case. See GATS,
supra note 19, arts. X, XVI, XVII, XVIII.
Julia Muir, The Importance of Regulatory Coherence in a World of Global Value
263.
Chain, INTER-AM. DEV. BANK: BEYOND BORDERS (May 2, 2017), https://blogs.iadb.org/integrationtrade/2017/05/02/the-importance-of-regulatory-coherence-in-a-world-of-global-value-chains/
[https://perma.cc/D8F2-WLQD]; see also Possible Way Forward on Electronic Commerce, supra
note 53, 1 2.4.
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these dialogues across different stakeholders may not result in
binding legal agreements, they will provide opportunities for
understanding the various dimensions of digital trade and for
identifying areas of concern and deep conflict. The WTO is well placed
to establish mechanisms for joint engagement and studies across
different policy areas of the digital economy. 2 64 Under the leadership

of Azevido, the WTO has already shown strong support for initiatives
such as eTrade for All, the Enhanced Integrated Framework, and the
eWTP-a completely private-sector initiative. 265 These initiatives are
crucial for integrating developing countries. In the future, trade
negotiators could also initiate dialogues with technology experts to
find better means of understanding how digital technologies could
achieve regulatory outcomes without imposing disproportionate costs
on companies. The participation of trade officials at the IGF and
experts from the Internet community at the WTO Public Forum are a
welcome development in this regard. 266 Further, certain Member
proposals before the WTO have also recognized the importance of
interinstitutional coordination in the development of a regulatory
framework for digital trade. 267
The complex and multifaceted nature of digital trade
necessitates synergy across different domestic, regional, and
international policy and legal frameworks. No existing international
or multistakeholder institution can by itself succeed in developing a
cross-cutting framework for digital trade. For instance, international
trade institutions are not capable of setting norms on cybersecurity or
technical interoperability (which are nonetheless instrumental for
digital trade). 268
Rather, multistakeholder Internet governance
institutions such as the ICANN, Internet Engineering Task Force

264.

See JOHN CORWIN, WORLD ECON. FORUM, DELIVERING DIGITAL INFRASTRUCTURE:

ADVANCING THE INTERNET ECONOMY 26 (2014); Tuthill, supra note 18, at 374, 375-76, 379.
265.
See Azevbdo, supra note 56.
266.
See, e.g., IGF 2016 Main Session: Trade Policy and the Internet, INTERNET
GOVERNANCE F. (Dec. 8, 2016), https://www.intgovforum.org/multilingual/content/igf-2016-mainsession-trade-policy-and-the-internet [https://perma.cc/RHA4-PLUE]; Transcript of Proceedings,
International Trade and Internet Governance, INTERNET GOVERNANCE F. (Sept. 15, 2010),

http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/transcripts/648-80 [https://perma.cc/JMC5-6JNN]. At the 2017
WTO Public Forum, the largest annual outreach event of the WTO, several sessions were
attended by Internet governance experts and advocates. For details, see Sorina Teleanu, Digital
Policy at WTO Public Forum: Summarising Day 1, DIPLOMACY (Sept. 27, 2017),
https://www.diplomacy.edufblog/digital-policy-wto-public-forum-summarising-day-1
[https://perma.cc/SR6Y-L34R].
267.
See discussion supra Part IV.A.5.
268.
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(IETF), World Wide Web Consortium (W3C), and IGF are better
suited to address such issues. 269 However, if these institutions
succeed in promoting risk-based, flexible approaches in technical
standard setting, then that will also complement liberalization of
digital trade. Similarly, UNCITRAL has a model law on electronic
signatures; 270 several regional bodies such as the OECD and APEC
have developed guidelines for cross-border online consumer dispute
resolutions as well as protection of personal information; 271 the United
and
privacy
on online
adopted resolutions
Nations has
cybersecurity; 27 2 and the ITU has adopted several resolutions and
declarations on standardization of Internet connectivity. 2 7 3 While the
rules and principles laid down by these institutions can be helpful in
opening up the digital economy, none of these institutions can directly
address discriminatory trade barriers arising from restrictions placed
on Internet platforms. In that scenario, the WTO and PTAs will
continue to play a central role.
The above discussion indicates that no single international
institution, including the WTO, can come up with a "grand design" to
resolve all issues in digital trade. 2 74 Nonetheless, it is possible for
these institutions to form various channels for feedback and
communication in order to enable more synergistic and coherent
disciplines in their specialized areas of practice. For example, the
WTO could develop a joint study with Internet governance institutions
to better understand how the technical features of the Internet relate
Similarly, the WTO
to commercial activities over the Internet.
committees can also seek feedback from specialized institutions on
issues of Internet privacy and consumer protection. 275 In recent years,
269.

See WILLIAM H. DUTTON,

MULTISTAKEHOLDER INTERNET GOVERNANCE?

18, 40

http://pubdoes.worldbank.org/en/591571452529901419/WDR16-BP-Multistakeholder(2015),
Dutton.pdf [https://perma.cc/PC6R-8C3N].
270.
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http://www.jus.unitn.it/users/caso/dpi01-02/topics/ecommerce/materialilun-model_1aw.pdf
[https://perma.cc/SW28-UPFH].
See, e.g., OECD Privacy Guidelines (2013), supra note 139, at 59; APEC Privacy
271.
Framework, supra note 139, at 34; OECD Recommendation on Consumer Dispute Resolution and
Redress,
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&

DEV.,

http://www.oecd.org/sti/consumer/

oecdrecommendationonconsumerdisputeresolutionandredress.htm [https://perma.cc/G6U6-23AY]
(last visited Apr. 1, 2018).
See G.A. Res. 68/167, at 1 (Jan. 21, 2014); G.A. Res. 64/211, at 1 (Mar. 17, 2010).
272.
For details of these standards, see Int'l Internet Connectivity, INT'L TELECOMM.
273.
UNION, https://www.itu.int/en/ITU-T/studygroups/2013-2016/03/Pages/iic.aspx [https://perma.cc/
KJB4-ZZHB] (last visited Apr. 1, 2018).
Cottier, supranote 236, at 434.
274.
See Neha Mishra, International Trade, Internet Governance and the Shaping of the
275.
Digital Economy 19-21 (UNESCAP ARTNeT Working Paper Series, Paper No. 168, 2017),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2997254 [https://perma.cc/4QF9-L7RM].
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the WTO has shown greater openness toward liaising with
multistakeholder and private institutions, particularly in areas
requiring a multifaceted response-such as the launch of the
"ICC-WTO Small Business Champions" initiative by the WTO and the
International Chamber of Commerce. 276 While such avenues may not
necessarily result in the creation of binding rules at the WTO, they
will facilitate a better understanding among trade experts as to how
digital trade rules are placed in the broader ecosystem of Internet
governance and will thus promote the development of better
mechanisms to balance trade and nontrade concerns in cyberspace
within WTO agreements.
V. CONCLUSION

This Article highlights that the WTO can and should have an
instrumental role in the development of the regulatory framework for
digital trade. Although the existing multilateral framework under the
GATS is largely deficient in addressing policy challenges arising in the
modern digital economy, this Article argues that there are several
routes to reform and improve the existing system. Further, although
countries are currently more proactive in developing disciplines on
digital trade in plurilateral or regional trade platforms because of the
ease and feasibility of negotiations, 27 7 this approach does not provide a
long-lasting solution. At best, PTAs can be a stepping stone to a
multilateral approach, allowing countries to test new rules on digital
trade in the short run while working toward a high-level consensus on
important digital trade issues. However, in the long run, in the
absence of a multilateral trade agreement on electronic commerce,
PTAs are unlikely to orchestrate a resilient and consistent global
framework for digital trade because of the heterogeneous and often
conflicting nature of Electronic Commerce Chapters in PTAs and their
potential conflicts with the existing multilateral system.
This Article also argues that an urgent need exists for
multistakeholder and multilayered engagement at the WTO on digital
trade issues through creative mechanisms. Many WTO Members
have already recognized the importance of several international and
regional institutions in developing a regulatory framework for digital
trade.2 7 8
Trade negotiators increasingly show willingness to

276.
See ICC and WTO Launch 'Small Business Champions' Initiative and Open Call for
Proposals, WORLD TRADE ORG. (Aug. 16, 2017), https://www.wto.org/english/news-e/
newsl7elbus_16augl7_e.htm [https://perma.cc/9NQD-ESBK].
277.
See discussion supra Part III.B.3.
278.
See discussion supra Part IV.A.2
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participate in other platforms, such as the IGF. Further, the WTO
itself has shown openness toward liaising and launching initiatives
with the private sector as well as other international institutions to
promote digital trade. These mechanisms will be useful in building a
comprehensive and diverse agenda within the WTO to address
existing barriers in digital trade, developing new disciplines on
relevant regulatory issues-such as privacy, data protection, and
consumer protection-and improving prospects for inclusion of
developing countries. With the increase in security and stability of
the global framework for digital trade, individual countries are also
likely to have more confidence in opening their digital trade markets
without being threatened by foreign competition. To achieve this
delicate balance between promoting expansion of the digital economy
and preserving the trust and integrity of Internet regulation, it is
important that the WTO endeavors to develop a more ambitious and
comprehensive agenda for reform under the Work Programme.
The recently held Eleventh WTO Ministerial Conference (the
"MC-11") brought various Member perspectives on electronic
commerce to the negotiating table.27 9 With respect to electronic
commerce, no significant developments occurred at MC-11, with the
exception that WTO Members agreed to renew the moratorium on
customs duties on electronic transmissions until 2019.280 Expectedly,
staunch opposition by the African Group 281 and India 2 82 was the key
factor in stalling any further discussion among the WTO
membership. 283 However, seventy WTO Members including the
European Union, Australia, the United States, and Japan declared
that they would form a new working group on electronic commerce to
A total of eight proposals were tabled at the Ministerial Conference from the
279.
following Members: Russia, Japan and co-sponsors (including Costa Rica), Bangladesh, the
African Group, India, Singapore and co-sponsors, and the European Union and co-sponsors. See
WTO Chairman, Work Programmeon Electronic Commerce, $T 1.1, 1.2, WTO Doc. WT/GC/W/739
(Dec. 1, 2017).
See World Trade Organization, Draft Ministerial Decision of 13 December 2017,
280.
WTO Doc. WT[MIN(17)/W/6 (2017).
281.

See, e.g., Statement by the African Group, Work Programmeon Electronic Commerce,

5.1, 5.2, WTO Doc. WT/MIN(17)/21 (Dec. 6, 2017) [hereinafter Second Statement by the
African Group]; Statement by the African Group, supra note 77, T 2.4; Report on "Digital
IndustrialPolicy and Development", supra note 48, ¶ 1.4.
See, e.g., Communication from India, Draft Ministerial Decision on Electronic
282.
Commerce, WTO Doc. JOB/GC/153 (Nov. 20, 2017); WTO Secretariat, Report of the Meeting Held
on 3 May 2017, T 1.13, WTO Doc. TN/S/M/46 (May 24, 2017).
These Members argued that pending issues from the Doha Development Round
283.
should be addressed first and that new disciplines on electronic commerce would further
constrain regulatory autonomy of developing countries; hence, it was completely unnecessary to
formulate new disciplines on electronic commerce at the WTO. See Second Statement by the
African Group, supra note 281, T 3.2.
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deliberate on contemporary challenges in electronic commerce,
including the potential applicability of WTO agreements. 28 4 In the
Authors' view, this declaration is a positive development and could be
an excellent starting point for renewing the vigor and pace of
discussions on electronic commerce at the WTO to pave a path for
reforms in the multilateral system.

284.
See Communication from Albania, et al., Joint Statement on Electronic Commerce,
WTO Doc. WT/MIN(17)/60 (Dec. 13 2017); see also New Initiatives on Electronic Commerce,
Investment
Facilitation and MSMEs,
WORLD
TRADE
ORG.
(Dec.
13,
2017),
https://www.wto.org/english/news-e/newsl7_e/minis13decl7e.htm
[https://perma.cc/5CSJAZP6]; Bryce Baschuk & David Haskel, WTO Members to Launch New Forum E-Commerce
Negotiations, BLOOMBERG
BNA
(Dec.
14,
2017),
http://news.bna.com/itln/display/
batch-print-display.adp?searchid=31151042 [https://perma.cc/GW3A-4A4Z].

